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ABSTRACT 
This thesis tries to identify which political and societal factors influence central governments’ 
fiscal balance. It conducts the analysis using the statistical technique longitudinal multilevel 
models. 46 electoral democracies are covered between 1980 and 2006. The research method 
used makes it possible to reliably study whether permanent features influence the countries 
fiscal balance. Such features were likely to affect outcomes as permanent differences in 
deficit levels have existed between countries, and in the empirical analysis they are found to 
have a significant influence.  
 
In previous research time-varying political factors have been found to influence the budgetary 
balance of countries, and in recent years some scholars have claimed that permanent political 
institutions might also influence deficit levels. The paper follows in this tradition but finds 
that the quality of governance (strength of rule of law, levels of corruption and the strength of 
the bureaucracy) has a more decisive impact on deficit levels that the choice of institutions. 
The choice of political leadership, e.g. the number or ideology of parties in government, that 
have dominated much previous research into the political effect on fiscal behaviour are not 
found to significantly explain the phenomenon. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research question 
This paper investigates central government deficits in electoral democracies. It aims at 
exploring which political and societal factors affect the government fiscal balance. In recent 
years there has been an effort to include permanent institutional features in the explanation of 
the fiscal balance. This paper follows in this tradition and builds on it. It especially 
investigates whether the quality of government institutions, as well as the type, might affect 
electoral democracies’ budget balance. This is an explanation that has been underexplored in 
previous research. 
 
 The research question is: 
 
Which political and societal factors influence central government’s budgetary balance in 
electoral democracies? 
 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and Skocpol (2003) have different views of many aspects of 
social science, but all agree that research within the field need to both answer real-world 
problems and engage in existing scientific discussions. This research question clearly does 
both. It will first be shortly outlined how government deficits is a question of high importance 
and saliency for current political. How it fits into the scientific discussion will be discussed in 
part 1.2.  
 
The period of analysis ends in 2006 at a time when there had been global growth for a 
continuous and extended period.  In 2006 “the number of countries in recession was at a 
historic low” (IMF 2009: 14). This period of growth was followed by a sharp downturn in the 
world’s economic fortunes which was accompanied by stark increases in government deficits. 
This situation was problematic for many governments. “Not since the second world war have 
so many governments borrowed so much so quickly or, collectively, been so heavily in hock” 
(Economist 2009: 11). The debt-to-GDP ratio in advanced economies is expected to reach 100 
percent by 2014, 35 percentage points higher than before the recession (IMF 2010: 6). The 
situation has made government deficits a salient political issue. Following a British 
parliamentary election where the budgetary balance had been one of the central issues, 
conservative party leader and future Prime Minister David Cameron called the high deficit 
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levels in the UK “the biggest threat to our national interest” (Reuters 2010). At the same time 
demonstrations over cuts in public expenditure to reduce the deficit were ravaging Greece 
(Economist 2010).  
 
The countries included in this analysis have very different average deficit levels. In Greece 
government spending has on average exceeded government incomes by 10.4 percent of the 
GDP, while incomes on average have exceeded spending by 8.7 percent in Botswana. There 
are also substantial variations within the countries. The differences within and between the 
countries might partly be caused by economic fluctuations. The period covered, 1980 to 2006, 
saw two global recessions, in 1982 and 1991, and a mild recession in the advanced economies 
in 2001 (IMF 2009: 11-12). It also saw extended periods of economic growth. However, the 
sustained differences in average deficit levels between countries indicate that deficits will be 
affected by more than just the international economic climate. This can either be time-varying 
economic or political factors, or permanent features of the countries. This paper will try to 
identify both. Identifying which factors are likely to affect fiscal policy is likely to be of high 
interest in policy formation at a time when deficit levels have become one of the foremost 
political issues in many countries.  
 
1.2 Scientific contribution 
For a long time academic views on fiscal policy adhered to Adam Smith’s claim from 1776 
that “what is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a 
great kingdom” (referred to in Buchanan and Wagner 1977: 3). In other words, this view 
espoused that governments should not spend more money than it earned. As a Keynsian view 
of the economy became more prevalent in the 20th century, the view that government deficits 
were always something negative is no longer universally accepted. On the contrary, it has 
become a consensus in both economic and practical political circles that the government has 
to lead a countercyclical economic policy to ameliorate the adverse consequences of 
economic downturns. Empirical studies have shown that economic fluctuations can not be the 
only determinant of fiscal balances however. It can neither explain why there seem to have 
been a tendency for countries to have different fiscal policy at different times with similar 
economic conditions, nor why different countries have led consistently different fiscal 
policies (Alesina and Perotti 1995). Other explanations have therefore been advanced to 
explain these differences. 
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Roubini and Sachs (1989a) argued that because economic fluctuations could not explain fiscal 
policy alone: “differing institutional arrangements in the political process of the various … 
economies also help to explain the markedly different patterns of budget deficits”. Various 
scholars have theoretically and empirically argued about which political and societal 
differences might create these differences. Roubini and Sachs (1989a ; 1989b) argued that the 
number of parties in government would affect fiscal policy. Hibbs (1986 ; 1987) and Persson 
and Svensson (1989) claimed that the ideology of the parties in government affected fiscal 
balances and several authors have claimed that deficits tends to be higher in election years 
than non-election years (e.g. Buchanan and Wagner 1977). These and several newer 
explanations of how politics might affect deficits will be further explored in the theory 
chapter of the thesis.  
 
Early and later inquiries into the effect of policy and politicians on fiscal policy have been 
dominated by time-varying phenomenon. These phenomena might explain the variance in 
deficit levels within countries over time, but are unlikely to entirely explain the permanent 
differences that seem to exist between countries however. In recent research some scholars 
have investigated whether countries with different political institutions lead different fiscal 
policies. This paper re-tests some of these claims. However, it also takes the research further 
by investigating if the quality of government institutions, and not just the type, might affect 
governments’ budgetary behaviour. This is an explanation that, as far as I know, has not been 
included in tested in previous research and its inclusion might therefore strengthen the 
understanding of governments’ budgetary behaviour. 
 
The analysis is conducted using a statistical method that is well adept at including both time-
varying and time-constant explanatory variables: longitudinal two-level analysis. The method 
also allows the researcher to find out whether the effects of time-varying variables are 
affected by permanent features in the countries’ political systems to find possible links 
between the time-varying and time-constant phenomenon. 
 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
In chapter two previous research will be presented and hypothesises generated. First the 
economic explanations that have traditionally dominated the field will be reviewed. Secondly 
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political theories will be presented. Some of these vary over time within the countries while 
other are permanent or close to permanent features of the different countries’ political systems. 
Finally, societal factors that might influence fiscal policy are presented. All of these vary very 
little over time. 
 
The method is presented in chapter three. It is argued that longitudinal two-level analysis is 
well suited to examine this research question. Afterwards the method and calculations are 
shortly presented, and statistical preconditions for the analysis are addressed. In chapter four 
the operationalization of the variables are presented. The criterion for electoral democracy is 
also identified. The countries were excluded in the years when they did not fulfil this criterion. 
Afterwards the operationalization of the dependent variable and the economic, political and 
societal explanatory variables are presented. 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out in chapter five. The analysis is conducted using several 
models that become increasingly complex and increasing explanatory power. The findings are 
interpreted in light of the hypothesises generated in chapter two. 
 
In chapter six the paper is concluded. Some implications of the findings for the theory on 
budgetary balance are drawn.  
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2 THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
The theory chapter will present previous explanations of fiscal policy behaviour. It is argued 
for including some aspects that have been underexplored in previous research. First economic 
factors that have been used to explain the phenomenon are outlined as these are the ones that 
have traditionally dominated the field. The economic explanations included are: economic 
growth, the openness of the economy and the inflation levels. Secondly political explanations 
of fiscal policy are shown. The explanations placed within this group are: the number of 
parties in government and parliament, whether the government has a majority in parliament, 
the ideology of government, the electoral system and size of constituencies, if the country is 
parliamentary or presidential, the countries membership in the European Monetary Fund, 
elections and finally the quality of government which has been little studied previously. 
Finally societal explanations are explored. The phenomena placed in this group are political 
instability, economic and social inequality and the age distribution of the population. Before 
these explanations are discussed a short presentation of the general views on government 
deficits is given.  
 
By exploring how permanent features influence fiscal policy the paper enters into a recent 
tradition in political science and economics where institutional explanations have become 
ever more central in the explanations of social phenomena (Ostrom 1986 ; North 1990). It is 
argued that one can not only look at the choice of institutions, but also how well the 
governance of the state is. 
 
2.2 Are deficits political? 
Neo-classical economics saw public deficits as an evil that should always be avoided. The 
view was later challenged by Keynsian economists who said that markets do not regulate 
themselves and that the state therefore has a role in preventing, at the very least, a breakdown 
of the economic system similar to the one that happened in the 30’s (Keech 1995: 26-27). 
There is however broad agreement that no government can have permanently high deficits 
without negative consequences. At the very least high government loans will mean that future 
government will have to prioritize interest payments ahead of other expenses. If the debts 
become uncontrollable the results may be even more damaging. Increased risk of default will 
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result in even higher interests and greater difficulty for the state in finding willing loaners 
which can reduce its ability to respond to future crises. Governments therefore have to find a 
balance between using loan financed expansionary policy to prevent excessive recessions and 
not putting to heavy debt burdens on future generations.  
 
Given these hard choices on which fiscal policy should be led it is likely that different 
politicians in different political and societal circumstances might reach different conclusions 
on what fiscal policy to lead. These choices are likely to be influenced by the political and 
societal climate the politicians operate within. But before looking at what these political 
influences might be, the economic factors that have traditionally been dominant in the 
explanations of fiscal deficits will be explored. Previous research into political and societal 
influences on fiscal policy will be presented. It will also be argued for looking at some 
possible explanations that has been overlooked in previous research, especially the quality of 
government institutions.   
 
2.3 Economic explanations 
The economic explanations that will be gone through in this part are: the growth rate of the 
economy, the openness to trade and the inflation levels. 
 
2.3.1 Growth rate of the economy 
In the neoclassical economic tradition public debt is seen as a transitional phenomenon which 
will increase temporarily under adverse economic conditions, such as during recessions or 
wars, and decrease when the economy is growing. The long term equilibrium is therefore 
expected to be a balanced budget, and deviations from this long term trend will be rational as 
they are the only possible consequence for a social planner who wants a constant tax level 
(Barro 1979). These theories therefore assume that taxes are set at a level were they just 
covers, the exogenously given, level of spending (Alesina and Perotti 1995: 5). 
 
Barro (1979: 954-969) finds that the economic growth rate explains debt levels in the US well. 
However, economic fluctuations can not explain how it is possible to have permanently high 
debt levels and why there seems to be differences between countries. Rather than reacting in 
the same way to similar external shocks to the economy, some countries have seemed much 
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more willing to take up new debt than other (Woo 2001: 388). It is possible that this can 
explain the significant changes in net government debt over time within every country better 
than it explains differences between countries. During adverse economic times it is likely that 
there will always be a higher risk of deficits because incomes will be reduced and the 
government will face pressures to lead expansionary fiscal policy, but some governments 
might be more susceptible to this pressure than other and some might be more able to reduce 
the deficits when the economic climate improves. 
 
Woo (2001: 391) also claims that the relationship might work in the opposite direction “if the 
successful pressures for higher public expenditures accompany the growing tax revenue due 
to higher economic growth”. This is obviously a theoretical possibility, but the overwhelming 
majority of previous theory and empirical results indicate that it is likely that the tax incomes 
will increase more than the expenditure during periods of economic growth, and vice versa 
during economic contractions. It is therefore assumed that economic growth leads to a 
decrease in government deficits. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Central government deficits will decrease during periods of economic growth.  
 
2.3.2 Openness of the economy 
Variation in different countries’ dependence on imports and exports might also affect their 
fiscal policy. It is possible that more open economies are more affected by changes in other 
countries than closed economies. The fiscal policy of open economies could be affected both 
positively and negatively by this openness since they will draw more benefits from growth in 
other countries and be more vulnerable when there is a recession in their trading partners. 
Nevertheless, Woo (2001: 394) thinks the vulnerability to outside shocks makes open 
economies harder to govern and that this might leads to higher public deficits. The increased 
vulnerability to outside shocks might make recessions and the pressure for expansionary fiscal 
policy more frequent. During these periods government debt can be expected to increase, and 
according to Buchanan and Wagner (1977) once a government has started leading a loan 
financed fiscal policy it is hard to reduce welfare spending and return to surpluses when the 
economic climate improves. Woo (2001) does not find strong empirical evidence for this 
claim however. It is nevertheless a strong theoretical argument and worth testing empirically. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Open economies have higher deficits. 
 
Midtbø (1999: 204-205), on the other hand, claims it is possible that more open economies 
have less of a possibility to make radical fiscal changes than countries with more closed 
economies. It is therefore more important for them to have stability and confidence from 
trading partners and investors. This is especially the case for small countries. Midtbø (1999: 
204) quotes Katzenstein who claims that: “Political laissez-faire is a luxury of large industrial 
countries, a luxury which the small European states cannot indulge”. This might therefore 
prevent the governments in these economies from leading a populist fiscal policy and they 
might instead have stricter fiscal discipline and smaller deficits. Since they are more 
susceptible to outside influences, an activist government might also have fewer abilities to 
influence their own economies the more dependent the country is on trade. This gives rise to a 
second hypothesis on the effect of the openness on the countries’ budgetary balance. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Open economies have lower deficits. 
 
2.3.3 Inflation 
Inflation might also affect government deficits. Rapid inflation can lead to higher nominal 
interest payments and thereby higher expenditure and larger deficits. Inflation can also lead to 
lower real tax revenue for several reasons. It can decrease the real tax collections, savings and 
in other ways decrease the value of the tax base or the taxes collected. Secondly, inflation can 
affect the measurement of taxable income. And thirdly: “it changes the real value of 
deductions, exemptions, credits, ceilings and floors, bracket widths, and all other tax 
provisions legally fixed in nominal terms” (Aaron 1976: 193). “If, however, income taxes are 
not indexed to inflation, the above effects of inflation on deficits can be at least partly offset 
by the positive effect of bracket creep on income tax revenue” (Woo 2001: 392). Woo (2001) 
tests the effects of inflation on fiscal policy, and finds limited support for that it might be 
negatively correlated with surpluses. This is therefore the hypothesis that is tested in this 
paper. 
 
Hypothesis 3: High inflation lead to larger deficits. 
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2.4 Political explanations 
Much of the arguments around which types of political institutions are most able to limit 
deficits follow the same arguments as the general discussion within political science about 
which government forms are most efficient. Arend Lijphart (1999) claims that there are two 
democratic government archetypes: majoritarian and consensual. In majoritarian systems the 
focus is on getting a strong government supported by a majority of the population and in 
consensual systems on getting as many groups in society as possible represented and working 
out compromises between these groups. It has been claimed that majoritarian systems create 
stronger governments. They centralise power in the hands of one group that is supported by a 
small majority, or even plurality, of the population. In consensual systems on the other hand 
decisions have to be chiselled out between all involved parties. This happens through 
cooperation and compromise which supposedly makes the government less able to create 
coherent political results (Norris 1997 ; Lijphart 1999: 64).  
 
A. Lawrence Lowell claimed in 1896 that coalition governments could not produce good 
results (referred to in Lijphart 1999: 64), and this is a view that has been echoed by authors 
until this day. Pippa Norris (1997: 6) claims that more majoritarian systems, where power 
sharing not is necessary, gives governments “enough freedom to carry out unpopular policies”. 
They might therefore also be less able to resist pressure for an expansionary fiscal policy. If 
majoritarian governments are more able than consensual governments at making autonomous 
decisions they might also be more able to resist demands for populist economic policies. By 
being able to make decisions that are unpopular in the short term they might be more able to 
follow policies in which are in the long-term interests of the country.  
 
In two articles Roubini and Sachs (1989a ; 1989b) started a discussion about whether different 
types of governments had a tendency to take up different levels of debt. They claimed that 
previous research on government debt had been too theoretical and wanted an empirical study 
on which factors actually influenced this phenomenon (Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 903-904). 
Specifically, they claimed that when power is centralised and placed with fewer actors it was 
easier to lead a strict fiscal policy than when more actors participate in the decision making 
process. 
“When power is dispersed, either across branches of the government (as in the U.S.), 
or across many political parties in a coalition government (as is typical in Italy), or 
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across parties through the alteration of political control over time, the likelihood of 
intertemporally inefficient budget policy is heightened” (Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 
905). 
This view follows clearly from the argument, mentioned above, that when decision making is 
more majoritarian you get a more efficient government, which in fiscal policy is usually seen 
as synonymous with reduced deficits. 
 
In this part the reasons for the following explanations of budgetary behaviour will be 
investigated: the number of parties involved in governing, the majority status of the 
government, the government’s ideology, the electoral system, the form of executive 
(presidential or parliamentary), the effect of the stability and growth pact and the European 
Monetary Fund, the effect of elections and the quality of government.  
 
2.4.1 Number of parties 
One of the political factors that has been most explored as a possible explanation of fiscal 
policy is the number of parties involved in governing. Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that a 
higher number of parties lead to higher deficits in their “war of attrition model”. The name 
alludes to their claim that the political parties in a coalition will try to wear the other ones out 
so that they will get concessions on policy. The model says that all fiscal adjustments in 
democracies involve a battle between different political actors who do not want the majority 
of the burden to be put on their constituency. This can lead to delays in passing measures 
necessary to prevent growing deficits, for instance higher taxes, as different parties argue over 
their distribution. Even though this situation can arise in all countries, “countries with political 
institutions that make it relatively more difficult  for opposing groups to ‘veto’ stabilization 
programs not to their liking will stabilize sooner” (Alesina and Drazen 1991: 1183). This 
means that the fewer parties that have an influence on governing, the easier it will be to return 
to an equilibrium after a crisis and therefore these countries will have lower deficits. Similarly, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a) claims that countries where power is dispersed find it hard to 
make necessary adjustments after external shocks. 
“Coalition governments are not inherently prone towards larger deficits … Rather, it 
appears that coalition governments are prone to large deficits in circumstances of 
highly  adverse macroeconomic shocks” (Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 923). 
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Other authors have defended a view that coalition governments systematically take up higher 
deficits than one party cabinets regardless of the economic conditions, and found some 
empirical support for the claim (Borrelli and Royed 1995 ; Volkerink and Haan 2001 ; Woo 
2001). The basis of this claim is the view that: “the larger the number of decision makers, the 
less each will internalize the costs that a certain policy will impose on others” (Volkerink and 
Haan 2001: 222). When several parties are involved in governing, they have a hard time 
internalizing the interests of broader groups than their own constituencies. Coalition 
governments are therefore seen as leading a less responsible fiscal policy than multi-party 
governments.  
 
Another reason for why coalition governments are claimed to lead a less strict fiscal policy 
than one party governments is that their time horizon is shorter. Borrelli and Royed (1995: 
234) claim that coalition governments last shorter than one party governments, and that this 
reduces the incentives for repeated play. All the parties will try to get their core demands 
through at the same time as they do not think they will have many chances to influence policy. 
There will therefore be fewer incentives for compromise than there is between the fractions of 
a catch-all party that expects a long spell in government. Consequentially, all participating 
parties might get what they want at once, and leave it to the predecessors to make the difficult 
cuts in spending or increases in taxes to pay for their excess.  
 
It is also claimed to be harder to build up trust between the partners when the turnover rate is 
higher, making it even harder to reach difficult compromises and give concessions to each 
other. 
“Effective budgeting requires long-range planning and implementation, which is 
difficult to do when the identity of the planners, at least at the highest (political) levels 
of government, keeps shifting with each new reshuffling of the Cabinet” (Borrelli and 
Royed 1995: 234). 
Furthermore, it is harder for the electorate to punish the politicians for enacting policies that 
are against the interest of the majority because responsibility for the cabinets’ actions is 
divided between the participating parties (Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 925-926). Voters not 
satisfied with the government’s performance therefore find it harder to know which rascals to 
kick out. Parties can therefore give their core constituencies what they want without fearing 
increased unpopularity among the wider public which has to contribute equally in paying for 
it.  
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Finally, coalition governments might lead less coherent politics since policy areas often are 
divided between the coalition partners, and because each partner often is given veto power 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 924). The individual parties might therefore not accept reductions 
in their core demands or increased demands on their core constituents. The result might be a 
system where it is impossible to make difficult choices since each major group has a defender 
in government who will not accept that they increase their contribution to the state or reduce 
the benefits they receive from the state. 
 
The hypothesis tested is therefore that when more parties participate in governing deficits 
increase, while deficits can be expected to be lower when power is more concentrated. This is 
tested for using two variables, as shown later, and two hypotheses are therefore created for 
this phenomenon. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the number of parties in government, the larger the deficits. 
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the number of parties in parliament, the larger the deficits. 
 
2.4.2 Minority or majority government 
Some theorists have claimed that similar mechanisms to the ones that are expected to make 
coalition governments more prone to budget deficit than one party governments makes 
minority governments more likely to have greater deficits than majority governments. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a ; 1989b) characterize minority governments as the least 
majoritarian of all government forms and see it as an extreme and weak form of coalition 
governing. They therefore expect even higher deficits under minority governments than under 
multiparty majority governments. Unlike coalition governments where consensus has to be 
sought between the governing parties, minority governments have to cooperate with parties 
outside of government to get a majority in parliament. Volkerink and de Haan (2001) claim 
that when more parties are involved in the decision making process responsibility is more 
diluted. This clearly happens in minority governments where responsibility is divided 
between the government and parliament. A “war of attrition” situation (Alesina and Drazen 
1991) might therefore arise where no group is willing to reduce their demands because they 
hope the other participating parties will concede before they do. The conditions under 
minority government might lead to greater deficits. 
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Hypothesis 5a: Minority governments produce higher deficits than majority governments 
 
There are however reasons to believe that minority governments might act differently than 
majority governments. Like coalition governments influence over how decisions are made is 
spread among several actors, but unlike coalition governments, minority governments can 
find different partners to secure a majority on different legislation. Strøm (1990) claims that 
this feature might make minority governments more efficient in pushing through their agenda 
than coalition governments. Since they do not need to cooperate with the same party in all 
areas the party (or parties) in government can partner up with parties that agree with them on 
individual legislation. The result is that they have a bigger chance of creating coherent policy. 
Furthermore, it might be easier to know who to punish for bad policies since there are usually 
(although not always) relatively few parties in minority government. The temptation to reward 
your core constituents might therefore be counterweight by the fear of sanctions in the next 
election.  
 
Minority governments have also been seen as shorter lasting than majority governments. They 
might therefore produce the negative results Borrelli and Royed  (1995: 234) claimed to 
plague short-lasting governments: no possibilities for repeated play and lack of trust between 
the partners. Strøm (1990) argues against this view, and say that minority governments are 
short lasting. He finds that: “coalition status (coalition vs. single party) is much more strongly 
correlated with duration than numerical status (majority vs. minority)” (Strøm 1990: 116). 
Unless co-operation in itself creates suboptimal outcomes the theoretical argument for why 
minority governments will produce deficits might therefore be weak. Instead these 
governments can instead have more freedom in the formulation of their fiscal policy. This 
allow them to lead a more consistent and stringent fiscal policy and produce lower deficits. 
Borelli and Royed (1995) finds some empirical support for the view that minority 
governments have lower deficits than other government types. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Minority governments produce lower deficits than majority governments. 
 
2.4.3 Ideology of government 
The type of party or parties in government might influence their fiscal policy just as much as 
the number of parties. There have been disagreements on which ideological leanings will be 
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most likely to increase the deficits however. Writing from an American perspective, Hibbs 
(1986 ; 1987) argued that left-wing governments would create higher deficits than 
governments with other ideological complexions.   
“[T]he core constituency of the Democratic Party consists of the down-scale classes, 
who primarily hold human capital and bear a disproportional share of the economic 
and broader social costs of extra employment. Up-scale groups form the core 
constituency of the Republican Party; they hold financial capital and absorb the 
greatest losses from extra inflation” (Hibbs 1986: 66). 
He claimed that this led to more expansive fiscal policy under Democratic administrations to 
ensure low unemployment, while Republican administrations would be more concerned about 
inflation and hence lead a less expansionary fiscal policy (Hibbs 1987: 251).  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Left-wing governments produce higher deficits than other governments. 
 
Others have claimed that the relationship between ideology and fiscal policy is opposite to the 
one argued by Hibbs. Persson and Svensson (1989) have argued that right wing governments 
will act strategically to secure that their ideological preferences prevail after they leave office. 
These strategic actions will lead to higher deficits under right-wing than under left-wing 
governments. They claim that when a conservative government knows it will be followed by a 
more expansionist government it will lower taxes more than it lowers social spending, take up 
national debt and in that way limit the next government’s ability to expand social services 
because it has to dedicate large portions of the budget to debt service payments. When more 
left wing parties enter governments they will be willing to raise taxes, but not able to expand 
the welfare provisions as much as they would have preferred. Midtbø’s (1999: 210-211) 
findings supports this view. He finds that under left-wing governments revenues are increased 
even more than expenditure and the result is lower net state debt. Therefore a second 
hypothesis, that contradicts 6a, also has to be made for the effect of ideology on fiscal policy 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Right-wing governments produce higher deficits in governments than other 
governments. 
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2.4.4 Geography of representation 
A basic assumption of several of the previous theories is that politicians will set the interests 
of their core constituencies ahead of the interests of the country as a whole. It has been 
claimed that multi-party governments take up higher deficits because all the parties will 
prioritize the interests of their core constituents over the interests of the population as a whole 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989a ; 1989b), or that left-wing governments will give the voters of 
working class background what they demand even if it means higher deficits (Hibbs 1987). If 
this assumption is correct it is therefore not hard to imagine that politicians will prioritize the 
interests of their constituents even if that contradicts the economic interests of the country as a 
whole (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). “Representatives with a geographically based 
constituency overestimate the benefits of public projects in their districts relative to the 
financing costs, which are distributed nationwide” (Alesina and Perotti 1995: 20). Politicians 
in all democratic countries have constituencies, but the size of these constituencies varies and 
if the above mentioned assumption is correct then countries with small constituencies can be 
expected to produce higher deficits. In these countries politicians are dependent on supporting 
many interests that have marginal importance for the country, but dominating importance in 
the small constituencies that elect them. Bigger constituencies on the other hand can be 
expected to have more complex economies and therefore the interests of their inhabitants 
might be expected to be more similar to the general interests of the national economy. The 
incentives for pork-barrel spending could therefore increase the smaller the constituencies are.  
 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) similarly claim that majoritarian elections with one-man 
constituencies will lead to higher spending because “those regimes that promote more intense 
competition imply policy choices that internalize the benefits and costs of fewer voters”. This 
leads them to conclude that countries with majoritarian electoral systems “bring about less 
public good provisions” (Persson and Tabellini 1999: 703). In proportional systems 
politicians have almost equal possibilities to gain seats throughout the entire country, but the 
more majoritarian the system becomes the more they have to rely on a few marginal seats to 
make gains as most of the constituencies usually has a clear majority for one of the parties.  
“Electoral competition is stiffer under majoritarian elections, as politicians try to 
please ‘swing voters’ in the marginal districts rather than the voters in the population 
as a whole. Among other things, this leads to more targeted redistribution, at the 
expense of public good provisions” (Persson and Tabellini 1999: 703). 
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These authors only investigate determinants of government expenditure and find some 
empirical support for the claim that countries with proportional electoral systems have higher 
public spending than other countries. It is nevertheless interesting to see whether this increase 
in spending is compensated for by increased incomes. This would mean that countries with 
majoritarian electoral systems have higher deficits than countries with more proportional 
systems, a claim that finds some empirical support in Woo (2001). This gives rise to two 
similar, but slightly different claims: that deficits will be higher in countries with small 
electoral districts in general and that deficits will be higher in countries with majoritarian 
electoral systems than in countries with more proportional systems. As will be shown in the 
operationalization chapter these nuances in the theories were accounted for in the analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Deficits will be higher in countries with small constituencies/majoritarian 
electoral systems. 
 
There can be an overlap between the electoral system and the number of parties in a country. 
Single member plurality constituencies have a tendency of producing two dominant parties 
and one-party governments (Duverger 1972). The effect mentioned above might therefore be 
outweighed by the smaller deficits one-party governments are said to produce. This effect can 
be controlled for however, and the relationship is not deterministic which makes it interesting 
to explore different combinations of electoral systems and the number of parties in parliament 
and government.  
 
2.4.5 Presidential and parliamentary regimes 
Presidential systems, like majoritarian electoral systems, lead to higher competition among 
politicians. However, Persson and Tabellini (1999) claims that the heightened competition 
will make the government under presidential systems smaller than they are under 
parliamentary, which is the opposite inference from the one used for electoral systems. The 
major difference is that while a majoritarian electoral system creates high levels of 
competitions before elections it creates a relatively stable political climate between elections 
as it usually produces big parliamentary majorities for one party. A presidential system on the 
other hand creates heightened competition between elections in addition to the competitive 
presidential elections. Politicians are held separately accountable by voters which makes the 
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competition between the branches of government more intense and gives the politicians fewer 
incentives to accept a compromise if it goes against the wishes of its voters.  
“As coalitions among politicians are more unstable, voters end up competing more 
fiercely for the redistributive transfers than in a parliamentary regime. These features 
imply less spending on every budget item in a presidential regime and, hence, a 
smaller size of government” (Persson and Tabellini 1999) 
The authors find that government is ten percentage points smaller in presidential regimes than 
in parliamentary. Again, they only focus on spending, but Woo (2001) finds some support for 
the claim that deficits might also be smaller in presidential regimes. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Deficits are lower in presidential countries than in parliamentary countries.  
 
2.4.6 The stability and growth pact and the European Monetary Union 
In 1997 The European Council passed the stability and growth pact (SGP) which was aimed 
at reducing the central government deficits in the countries that were members of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). It stated that member countries should avoid “excessive 
deficits” (which was defined as three percent of GDP) in the short term and that they should 
achieve budgets “close to balance or in surplus” in the medium term (de Haan, Berger and 
Jansen 2004: 236). The pact includes few mechanism to sanction countries that diverge from 
these goals, but there are several ways in which the member countries fiscal situations are 
supervised and if the deficits become to large they are given advise on how to reduce them 
and might loose the confidence of the markets (von Hagen 2006: 31). 
 
There have been discussions on how efficient the SGP has been in achieving this goal. De 
Haan, Berger and Jansen (2004) claims that the enforcement mechanisms in the pact are too 
weak for it to work efficiently and that to the degree it can affect the deficit levels of the 
countries it has a bigger impact on the small member states than the big ones. Big countries 
are able to withstand possible consequences of breaking the agreement (such as a less 
international confidence in their fiscal discipline) but for small countries this can be a greater 
liability. They therefore find that in some relatively small member countries, e.g. Belgium, the 
SGP has contributed in reducing the deficits. They argue that smaller countries are susceptible 
to peer pressure because their influence in the EU relies on them being seen as an active 
participant in the project. Larger countries on the other hand are “less susceptible to peer 
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pressure than smaller ones, as they are unlikely to loose their influence on EU policies 
anyway” (de Haan, Berger and Jansen 2004: 9). The view that the EMU might have had some 
effect on fiscal policy, but that this effect is very limited is supported by other scholars (Buti 
and van den Noord 2003 ; Von Hagen 2003).  
 
Others have found that fiscal agreements can reduce the deficits however. Debrun et.al. (2008) 
for instance finds that the European Monetary Union might have had some effect on the 
limitation of EU countries’ deficits after controlling for other factors, although this effect was 
even stronger in the years leading up to EMU than it was after the introduction of the stability 
and growth pact. In these years the countries had to show fiscal discipline to be allowed as 
members in the Euro. This gives rise to two hypothesises. First, one should test whether 
deficits are lower for members of the stability and growth pact and whether there is a 
difference between large and small members. Secondly, one should test whether countries 
lead different fiscal policies in the period when they tried to obtain membership in the 
European monetary fund. 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Deficits will be lower for countries in the stability and growth pact, and the 
effect of membership is especially high for small countries. 
Hypothesis 9b: Deficits will be lower for countries that are in the accession process to the 
European Monetary Union. 
 
2.4.7 Fiscal illusions 
An assumption in several of the previous models is that politician can mislead the electorate. 
Many theories assume that politicians are able to lead an economic policy that favours their 
core constituencies, but are against the interests of the general public or the long-term 
interests of the country, without being punished for it at the next election. This implies a view 
of the general public in democracies as both inattentive and short-sighted. This has led some 
theorists to claim that the need for popular supports leads to consistently populist policies and 
makes democracies generally less fiscally responsible than non-democracies (Buchanan, 
Tollison and Rowley 1987). This paper only looks at democracies and can therefore not test 
possible differences between democracies and non-democracies, but a similar argument has 
been used to argue that deficits will be higher in election years then at other times. In these 
years politicians needs the support of voters which do not completely understand how the 
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economy of the state works, but reward incumbents that provides economic growth. Tufte 
(1978: 143) therefore argued that the “electoral-economic cycle breeds a lurching stop-and-go 
economy the world over,” and “a bias towards policies with immediate, highly visible benefits 
and deferred, hidden costs – myopic policies for myopic voters”. This is the theory of fiscal 
illusions. 
 
The theories of fiscal illusions have a long history. Already in 1903 the Italian economist 
Amilcare Puviani claimed that citizens found it hard to estimate the exact connection between 
their tax levels and the levels of government spending. This led to a situation where: “the 
taxpayer’s perception of the equilibrium between utility and sacrifice [is distorted]” (Fausto 
2006: 82). Several later theorists have claimed that politicians try to fool the public by 
increasing welfare spending without increasing taxes whenever they need the citizens support, 
for instance before elections. When elections are not looming the public is less attentive and 
the politicians are less in need of high public popularity so they are more able to focus on the 
long term economic interests of the country and lead a prudent fiscal policy, but when 
elections approach they need popular support and they gain this by spending a lot on popular 
initiatives without demanding higher taxes to pay for this extra spending.  
“In a nutshell, the idea of fiscal illusions is that voters do not understand the 
intertemporal budget constraints of the government.  When offered a deficit-financed 
expenditure program, they overestimate the benefits of current expenditures and 
underestimate the future tax burden. Opportunistic politicians who want to be 
reelected take advantage of this confusion by increase spending more than taxes in 
order to please the ‘fiscally illuded’ voters” (Alesina and Perotti 1995: 9). 
This finding is for instance supported by Nordhaus, Alesina and Schultze (1989: 43-44) who 
find that in the USA taxes tends to be raised shortly after elections while benefits tend to be 
increased shortly before elections. The finding is supported by several other scholars and with 
different explanations. One explanation that has been dominant in recent research is that 
voters want to elect the most economically competent politician. Politicians therefore increase 
public spending before elections politicians hope that voters will credit the increased welfare 
to the politicians’ competence and overlook the increased spending (Persson and Tabellini 
2000 ; Shi and Svensson 2002 ; De Haan and Mink 2005). 
 
The increased chance of a future change in government can also prevent the incumbent 
government from internalizing the costs of additional debt as it might be born by their 
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successor (Woo 2001: 394). After the election the government can return to more prudent 
policies. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Deficits are higher before elections than at other times. 
 
2.4.8 Quality of Government 
As has been showed earlier, some previous research has tested whether countries with 
different political institutions lead different fiscal policies. One possibility that has been 
overlooked in much previous research is that how well those institutions function might also 
influence fiscal policy. It has previously been claimed that better quality of government 
improves economic policy outputs in other areas, for instance by: increasing per capita 
income (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999) and reducing inequality (Chong and 
Calderón 2000). Government quality has been less explored as a possible explanation of fiscal 
policy. How well the political institutions function might for instance affect government debt. 
In systems where rule of law is weak the endemic corruption that often follows acts “like an 
illegal tax that distorts decision-making and economic processes” (Holmberg, Rothstein and 
Nasiritousi 2008: 15). This gives the government less control over the countries’ economy 
and might make it harder to lead a strict fiscal policy. These problems might be enhanced by 
other effects corruption have been shown to have. High corruption levels correlates with 
decreasing state incomes (Ghura 1998 ; Tanzi and Davoodi 2000) and increased military 
spending (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2001), both of which can be expected to increase 
government deficits. 
 
The strength of rule of law might also serve as an indicator of the general belief in the 
political system, and the participants’ willingness to follow rules put down for the general 
good even when they go against individual interests. Some scholars claim to have found 
strong causal evidence for a positive effect of strong government institutions on economic 
growth (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). Even though the strength and direction of causality has 
been questioned by others (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008: 16-17) it is not hard to 
imagine that it is easier to lead a strict fiscal policy in a country where laws and the judiciary 
is respected.  
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The strength of a countries bureaucracy might have a similar effect, by instilling a system 
where rules and not personal interests are the guiding principle. Bureaucracy quality has 
therefore gotten an ever more central position as an explanation of social phenomena 
(Dahlstöm, Lapuente and Torell 2009: 6). A strong bureaucracy might also temper the effects 
of political change by offering high levels of expertise and thereby both reduce the turbulence 
that arises with government changes and the impact of the government parties’ ideology. 
There are therefore reasons to believe that the quality of government has high importance for 
the climate within which fiscal policy is made, and that it is easier to lead a strict fiscal policy 
when the quality of government is high. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Deficits decrease as the quality of democratic institutions increase in a 
country. 
 
2.5 Societal explanations 
There has been an increased focus on how the different political choices in different countries 
can help explain fiscal policies. This has improved previous models which only focused on 
economic explanations, and made them better at explaining both permanent differences 
between countries and intertemporal variation within countries. Some permanent features of 
the political system are also expected to influence fiscal policy, as shown above. One should 
also control whether permanent features of the society, which determine the climate within 
which fiscal policy is made, might also influence its results. The explanations discussed in 
this part are: political instability, economic and societal inequality and the proportion of the 
population which is elderly. 
 
2.5.1 Political instability 
Political instability reduces the possibility for politicians to make long-term considerations 
because their immediate concerns are more pressing. If they do not address them their 
political survival might be in danger. By reducing the time horizon that politicians consider 
when they make decisions those decisions can be expected to be more geared towards 
immediate popular approval and the incentives for trying to get thorough all their wishes at 
once are increased (Roubini and Sachs 1989a ; Woo 2001: 394-397).  
“Faced with the uncertainty over re-election, the incumbent government may fail to 
internalize the costs of additional debt because these costs are borne by the succeeding 
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government that may be controlled by the opposition party with different preferences” 
(Woo 2001: 395). 
Woo (2001: 394-397) claims that this dynamic might be permanent in societies where the 
political life constantly is turbulent. In these societies the stakes in the political game is often 
higher and political lives are often shorter. Politicians therefore have to think more about how 
popular their policies are in the short term, and have less to loose if they enact policies that 
have unbeneficial consequences in the long run, as they are more likely to be out of office 
when they hit. 
 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) has a further argument for why greater political polarization will 
lead to greater fiscal deficits. They rightly claim that one of the few ways in which 
governments can bind the policies of its successor is by taking up government debt and that 
this tool will be used more actively if there is a greater turnover of governments. By spending 
above the optimal level and taking up state debt the current government can oblige future 
governments to service the debt they take up and thereby limit their ability to invest in the 
policy-areas where they disagree. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Deficits are higher in countries with much political instability than in other 
countries. 
 
It is possible that the relationship between political instability and fiscal policy is really 
reverse. It has been claimed by many that difficult economic conditions can create social 
instability. Huntington (1968: 39-40) for instance said that: “clearly countries which have 
high levels of both social mobilization and economic development are more stable politically. 
Modernity goes with stability”. Furthermore, “to the extent that public deficits can cause 
serious macroeconomic instability such as hyperinflation or poor economic growth, they may 
foster violent behaviours of both political and non-political motives” (Woo 2001: 397). In 
most cases the fiscal policy will be part of the reasons for these situations and in all cases a 
possible relationship between deficits and political instability will be indirect. I therefore think 
it is unproblematic to assume that political instability might cause deficits while a possible 
relationship in the opposite direction is at most minor and indirect. 
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2.5.2 Economic and social inequality 
Both economic (Lichbach 1989 ; Alesina and Perotti 1996 ; Gasiorowski 1998) and social and 
ethnic (Alesina et al. 2003) polarization has for long been identified as important determinants 
of conflict.  High polarization can therefore be expected to influence fiscal policy in a similar 
way to the influence of political instability explained above, and lead to “populist fiscal 
policies and poor macroeconomic performance” (Woo 2001: 402). In democracies with high 
ethnic and social inequality it is also likely that a more fractionalized party system will be 
created as the interests of the different groups are further apart than in other countries. This 
might increase an existing situation under a “war of attrition” situation (Alesina and Drazen 
1991) and paralyze the political system as different parties find it harder to cooperate and are 
less willing to compromise. Several previous researchers have made the link between 
heightened ideological fractionalization and increased deficits and found some empirical 
support for it (Franzese Jr. 2001 ; Huber, Kocher and Sutter 2003). Woo (2001) also finds 
economic inequality to be a highly significant predictor of fiscal deficits. 
 
Hypothesis 13a: Deficits are higher the higher in economically unequal countries. 
Hypothesis 13b: Deficits are higher the higher in socially fractionalized countries. 
 
2.5.3 Age distribution of population 
It is also possible that deficits will be larger in countries where large portions of the 
population are old than in countries where they constitute a smaller part of the population. 
Most elderly persons are pensioners and might therefore weight unproportionally on the 
government budget both because they are not part of the tax base and because they receive a 
disproportionately large portion of public expenditure, especially in health care. Woo (2001: 
394) tests whether the portion of the population over 65 can contribute in explaining 
countries’ fiscal policy but only finds statically significant support for that claim in the 
developing countries he includes in his research. It is nevertheless an intuitive claim and 
should therefore be controlled for. 
 
Hypothesis 14: Deficits increase as the elderly share of the population increase. 
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3 METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explain longitudinal multilevel models. It will argue for why it is well suited 
to explore my research question, explain how the model is built up and show how it was used 
in the research for this paper. 
 
It has previously been claimed that quantitative methods are ill-adept at explaining complex 
phenomenon or finding intricate explanatory models. Pierson for instance warns that often in 
quantitative research: “the priority on generating high correlations privileges “‘shallow’ 
(temporally proximate but often near-tautological) accounts over ‘deep’ ones” (Pierson 2003: 
199). Similar arguments are presented by Skocpol (2003: 414) and McKeown (1999: 170-171) 
who claim that qualitative research is better at incorporating context in its explanations. The 
goal of this research project is partly to address these criticisms within a quantitative 
framework by incorporating contextual factors and causal heterogeneity in the explanation of 
fiscal policy. Longitudinal multilevel analysis is a statistical technique is well suited for this 
since it allows the researcher to control for time-constant contextual factors as well as 
including time-varying explanations. 
 
In this chapter the reasons for using the longitudinal multilevel analysis will first be presented. 
Afterwards it will be shortly outlined how the model function before it is shown how some 
preconditions for a reliable analysis were tested for. 
 
3.2 Longitudinal multilevel analysis 
Multilevel analysis was originally developed to explain social processes which happened at 
several levels at the same time. It did, for example, make it possible to explain pupils’ school 
results with variables at both the class and at the school level, and to see which of these two 
levels explained most of the variation. The research theme in this thesis, central government 
deficit, is a phenomenon that only exists at one level however, that of the central government. 
Several observations are therefore nested within each country and it is both possible to 
introduce time-constant and time-varying variables. The time varying variables are introduced 
on level-1 and the time constant on level-2. Instead of having several pupils nested within 
each class several observations at different time points are nested within each country. By 
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using the variance between countries as one level and the variance over time within the 
countries as the other level it becomes possible to distinguish between the variables that create 
variance within each country over time and the variables that create permanent differences 
between the countries. It is also possible to see whether there are different growth trajectories 
in the different countries and to look at the interaction between time constant and time varying 
variables. One can find out whether the time-varying variables have different effect on 
countries with different institutional arrangements and societal compositions. It is also 
possible to see what may cause these differences in effect. These are exactly the questions that 
have been unanswered in previous research and that this paper hopes to contribute in 
answering. 
 
3.3 Why use a longitudinal multilevel method? 
In this part it will be argued for why longitudinal two-level models are well suited for this 
research project. The substantive advantages will be shown first and the statistical afterwards.  
 
3.3.1 Substantive advantages:  
Multilevel analysis has a number of advantages over other quantitative methods and is well 
suited to investigate my research question: what political and societal factors explain 
government’s fiscal balances? It is especially well suited to find out which time-constant 
factors might explain the phenomenon. The model offers possibilities in the study of 
comparative politics and political economy that can compliment and strengthen previous 
research. Przeworski and Teune (1970: 74) claimed that the goal of comparative research is to 
study “the influence of larger systems upon the characteristics of units within them”. 
Multilevel research can take account of both these levels in a better way than traditional one-
level quantitative methods. The method therefore “provides a closer fit between … theory and 
model specification” (Western 1998: 1234) and makes it less likely that the model suffers 
from model misspecification as many theories imply a connection between several layers 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). This can either be by showing how persons or countries 
are affected by the groups they are members of or, as in my case, how constant characteristics 
of a country influences the effect of time-varying variables.  
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In this paper it is possible to see how economic growth influences deficits while controlling 
for permanent institutional and societal factors that are likely to differ between countries. By 
introducing time-constant and time-varying effects in two different levels while allowing for 
interaction between them the research becomes more complex and describes better the 
political climate within which policy is made. Schumpeter (1954: 34) stated in his explanation 
of political economy that: “’economic laws’ are much less stable than are the ‘laws’ of any 
physical science … [T]hey work out differently in different institutional conditions, and … 
the neglect of this fact is responsibility of many an aberration”. Multilevel models allows the 
researcher to not only control for these different institutional arrangement, but also see which 
factors might increase or limit their influence on the dependent variable. This has been called 
“causal heterogeneity” (Western 1998). Since causal relationships are likely to be different in 
countries with different institutional and societal characteristics such heterogeneity is needed 
for an accurate understanding of the phenomenon that is studied. Longitudinal two-level 
analysis allows the researcher to control for this. It is therefore exceptionally well suited to 
study how permanent political and societal factors might influence fiscal policy. 
 
Specifically longitudinal multilevel analysis allows the researcher to create different growth 
curves for each country (Hox 2002: 93), and it is therefore consistent with: “the basic insight 
of comparative politics… [that] political processes play out differently in different settings” 
(Western 1998: 1233-1234). It also allows causal heterogeneity, both by separating between 
variables that determines constant differences and variables that determine differences within 
the countries over time. It also makes it possible to find connections between these levels. 
“[I]t is possible to determine whether the causal effect of lower-level predictors is conditioned 
or moderated by higher level predictors” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). King, Keohane 
and Verba (1994: 8) identifies the ability to generalize as the main characteristic of scientific 
research. Longitudinal multilevel analysis can lead to reliable generalizations because it can 
be tested whether theories that originate in one condition apply equally under different 
circumstances (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).  
 
This offers new possibilities in the study of government debt. Longitudinal multilevel models 
can help: “disentangle questions about interindividual predictors … from intrainduvidual 
predictors” (Luke 2008: 545-546). In other words: it is possible to see which variables 
influences variance over time and which influence differences between countries. Most 
previous studies of government deficits have utilized panel models with fixed effects. They 
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have therefore been unable to tell whether the significant explanatory variables first and 
foremost determine variance in debt within the countries over time or constant differences 
between the countries. For instance, the number of parties in government, which has been 
found by several scholars to have a significant effect on fiscal policy, might change the 
incentives within a country over time as a country move from a one to a multi-party 
government or there might be a different dynamic in countries where big coalitions are the 
norm than in countries where one party governments dominate. These differences in political 
culture might persist even when a country deviates from its normal number of parties in 
government because a political culture of compromise or lack of willingness to compromise 
has been established. By being able to see whether constant features in each country affects 
the government’s propensity to loan it is possible to explain better why there seem to by 
permanent differences in the level of debt between countries with different institutional 
arrangements. Panel analysis with random effects is able to include such permanent 
differences between countries, and there are also ways of explaining differences in growth 
rate. Such models can not find possible differences in development paths between countries 
and explain why these exist however. These advantages make longitudinal two-level model 
well suited to explore the research question in this paper. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical advantages:  
Multilevel models also have some statistical advantages over regular one-level models. By 
better modeling the social phenomenon one wants to explain multilevel models reduces the 
risk of “possibly incorrect standard errors and inflated Type I error rates” (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002: 219). Type I errors occur when the null-hypothesis is falsely rejected, in other 
words: when a variable which is really insignificant is found to be significant (Pennings, 
Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2006: 60). The inclusion of dummy variables in panel analysis can 
control for context and constant differences between the countries, but “they do not explain 
why the regression regimes for subgroups are different” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 220). 
This removes the ability to explain permanent differences between countries, which is 
precisely what this paper aims to do. By including subgroup level predictors one can also 
show predictors for subgroups, but these models assume that these variables accounts for the 
entire variation in the subgroup because they does not have subgroup error terms. “This is a 
very strong assumption that will usually prove to be false” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 221). 
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Multilevel models can therefore better explain which stable political and societal factors 
influences fiscal policy tan other quantitative methods. 
 
Multilevel models also handle missing data well. The calculations are not biased if some 
groups enter the analysis later than other or if some countries have missing data for some 
years (Hox 2002 ; Luke 2004: 63-64) This is a great advantage in this paper as the focus is 
only on electoral democracies and it makes it possible to exclude the countries in the years 
when they are judged as undemocratic. It is for instance possible to include many of the 
former Warsaw pact countries that have been excluded in most previous research within the 
field. They became democratic long after 1980, which is the first year covered in the study. 
The exclusion of these countries in the years they were not deemed electoral democracies 
does not cause problems for the statistical calculations. Likewise, it is not problematic that 
there are missing data on the dependent variable. 
 
Furthermore, the possibility of including both time varying and time constant variables means 
that one can model both the average group development and the development of individuals 
[or countries]” (Hox 2002: 93). This makes the model able to find causal relations that might 
have been overlooked in research using other statistical methods.  
 
3.4 The longitudinal multilevel model 
The multilevel model has both statistical and substantive advantages that make it especially 
well suited to answer the research question in this paper. However, before operationalizing the 
variables it is necessary to quickly specify the underlying functioning of longitudinal 
multilevel models to get a proper understanding of how it works. 
 
All two-level models contain two parts, one for each level. For longitudinal models the level-
1 model, where the time varying variables are included, is: 
εβββ titiitiiiti XTY +++= 210
 
Here Yti is the dependent variable, the value for country i at time t, in this case the level of net 
deficits. β are the coefficients on level-1. β0i is the initial score for country i on the dependent 
variable, in other words the predicted level of deficits when all explanatory variables have the 
value zero. T is a time variable that indicates the time point of each unit. In this analysis this is 
a variable that rises with one each year. It has the value zero in the mid-year, 1993, the value  
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-13 in 1980 and +13 in 2006. β1i is the rate of change for country i. Xti is a time varying 
covariate, or in other words: a variable with different values over time. This can for example 
be the number of parties in government or a dummy for whether there is an election that year 
or not. The variables with constant values for all time points in each country are the level-2-
variables, which will be explained further below. εti is the random error at level-1 which is 
made up of the unexplained variance that is not constant between the countries. This is 
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a constant variance of σ² (Hox 2002 ; 
Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 ; Luke 2008). 
 
The level two part of the model is sometimes called the inter-individual part of the model 
because it includes permanent differences between the persons or countries that are studied. 
The level two equations are denoted in the following ways: 
u ii 0000 += γβ  
u ii 1101 += γβ  
u ii 2202 += γβ  
The initial score on the dependent variable for country i is β0i. It is predicted by the grand 
mean of all the individual intercepts, γ00, plus the variability of the individual intercepts 
around the grand mean, u0i. In this study that is the grand mean of net government debt and 
the deviance from that mean. Similarly, the slopes for one country, β1i, is predicted by the 
grand mean of country slopes, γ10, and the variability of the individual slopes around that 
mean, u1i. This is the average change in surpluses and the countries’ variance around this 
average. The i subscript indicate that each country is allowed to have its own growth curve. 
The countries deficit levels can therefore change at different rates and the reasons for these 
differences can be found. Finally, β2i makes it possible to explore the difference in the effect 
of the explanatory variables between the countries included in the analysis. γ10 is the average 
effect of the variable, while u2i is the deviance from that average effect. This can for instance 
be the average effect of political instability and how the countries deviate from this average. 
Again the i indicates that the effect of the variable on the deficit levels can be different in the 
different countries and the reason for these differences can be found. This makes it possible to 
explain the reasons for why one model has different effects in different countries (Luke 2008: 
548-555). 
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The combined model is therefore:  
[ ] [ ]εγγγ titiitiiitititi XuTuuXTY ++++++= 210201000  
The first half of the equation is the fixed part of the model while the last half is the random 
part. The random effects are similar to error terms and multilevel models thereby have error 
terms at each level in addition to the traditional individual error term, εti (Luke 2004: 11). 
 
3.5 Maximum likelihood estimation 
The most common estimation procedure in multilevel modeling is maximum likelihood (ML) 
(Hox 2002 ; Luke 2008). “[T]his type of estimation works by maximizing a likelihood 
function that assesses the joint probability of simultaneously observing all the sample data, 
assuming a certain set of fixed and random effects” (Luke 2008: 555). There are more ways of 
calculating the estimations, but maximum likelihood has been found to produce reliable 
results. When the assumptions are fulfilled maximum likelihood estimation “is consistent and 
asymptotically efficient” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 225). Furthermore, when you have 
large samples maximum likelihood estimations usually remain: “robust against mild 
violations of the assumptions, such as having non-normal errors” (Hox 2002: 37-38). This 
analysis has an N of over 1000 and should therefore be relatively reliable. In addition ML 
performs well with unbalanced designs, and its fixed effect estimates are consistent 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 225). This is a great advantage in this study because the data is 
quite unbalanced. The are significant gaps in the data both because countries have been 
dropped in years when they are not considered electoral democracies and because there are 
missing data for some time points in the dependent variable. 
 
There are two ways of producing the likelihood function in maximum likelihood estimation: 
full maximum likelihood (FML), where both the regression coefficients and the variance 
components are included in the likelihood function, and restricted maximum likelihood 
(RML), where only the variance components are included in the likelihood function and the 
regression coefficients are calculated separately. FML often has more bias in its calculation of 
the variance components than RML. However, the differences in results produced are usually 
very small. FML is therefore the most widely used method as it has two other advantages over 
RML estimation. Firstly, FML is generally easier to compute. Secondly, you can compare 
how two models differ, while with RML you can only compare how the random parts of the 
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model differs (Hox 2002: 38). Luke (2004: 28) therefore advises the use of FML when the 
two methods produce similar results. In this analysis the differences between the results using 
the two methods is not very large and FML is therefore utilized.  
3.6 HLM 
The statistical model used for the analyses in this paper is HLM (hierarchical linear modeling). 
This program was developed to handle multilevel models, both when times are nested within 
units and when smaller units are nested within larger ones. It is therefore exceptionally well 
suited to test multilevel hypotheses (Raudenbush et al. 2004).  
 
3.7 Preconditions 
Some preconditions have to be fulfilled if the results of longitudinal multilevel models are to 
be reliable. In this section it will be examined how well these preconditions are fulfilled. First 
it will be discussed whether the models are normally distributed, then whether there are 
problems of heteroskedastisitet or autocorrelation and finally whether the relationship is linear. 
 
3.7.1 Non-normal distribution of errors 
Non-normal distribution of errors on level-1 can “adversely influence the estimated standard 
errors for the estimates of the fixed effects and inferential statistics” (Raudenbush et al. 2004: 
38). It can in other words introduce bias into the confidence intervals which can affect the 
computation of significance levels and make the researcher dismiss a hypothesis that is 
correct or confirm a hypothesis that is incorrect. The normal distribution of the level-1 errors 
can be visually inspected. This graph seems to indicate that the residuals are close to normally 
distributed with some outliers. Removing these outliers from the analysis does not drastically 
alter the results however. It is therefore concluded that non-normality of the errors on level-1 
does not lead to mistakes in deeming variables significant or not significant. 
 
Non normal errors can also be problematic on the second level of analysis where the time-
constant features of the countries are tested.  
“Estimation of the fixed effects will not be biased by a failure of the normality 
assumption at level 2. However if the level-2 random effects have heavy tails, 
hypothesis tests and confidence intervals based in normality may be sensitive to 
outliers. A failure of the normality assumption will affect the validity of the 
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confidence intervals and hypothesis tests for the fixed effects” (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002: 274).  
The level-2 outcomes are not directly observed and this makes testing of this assumption 
harder, but the Mahalanobis distance measure can “help in assessing the degree of departure 
of the random effect from normality and allows detection of outliers” (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002: 274). “If the normality assumption is true, then the Mahalanobis distances should be 
distributed approximately χ²(v)”. Running a plot of the Mahalanobis distance against the 
expected values show the level-2 random effects are close to normal, but also that Botswana 
is an outlier. Removing Botswana from the analysis only leads to minimal changes in the 
results and these are commented on in the analysis chapter.  
 
3.7.2 Heteroscedasticity 
Homo- and heteroscedasticity: “refer to the correspondence of the spread of residuals with the 
independent variables. If the residuals have a constant variance, regardless of the value of the 
independent variables, we call them homoscedastic; but if their variance is variable, we call 
them heteroscedastic” (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2006: 161). In other words, 
heteroscedasticity occurs when the error terms do not vary randomly but correlates with the 
independent variables and this makes the results of the analysis less reliable. It often arises 
when the independent variables are related to each other. This could be a problem in this 
paper as some of the independent variables, e.g. the number of parties in cabinet and 
parliament probably has some relation to each other (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 
2006: 161-162; Wooldridge 2009: 52-53). 
 
HLM can compensate for heteroscedasticity (Yeh et al. 2007: 198). The program produces 
robust standard errors which are: “less dependent on the assumption of normality [of the 
residuals], at the cost of sacrificing some statistical power” (Hox 2002: 201). HLM therefore 
provides consistent “consistence intervals and hypothesis tests even if the HLM assumptions 
about the distribution and covariance structure of random effects are incorrect” (Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002: 278) Because there is a possibility of heteroscedasticity in the model the 
robust standard errors are used in the calculations and are the only ones which are reported in 
the analysis. Robust standard errors only function properly when the number of level-2 units 
are at least moderately high (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 276). It is difficult to say precisely 
what a high enough number of level-2 units is, but the 46 included in this analysis is not very 
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low and the robust standard errors are therefore assumed to prevent possible problems with 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
3.7.3 Autocorrelation 
Problems of autocorrelation can for instance arise if the unexplained variance is positive at 
several consecutive time points (Wooldridge 2009: 350). This can lead to either over- or 
underestimation of “the true variability of the coefficient estimates” (Petersen 2009: 435). 
HLM does account for correlation within the groups over time (Short et al. 2006). There are 
nevertheless some signs of autocorrelation. These can be ameliorated by introducing a lagged 
version of the dependent variable. This does not alter the results drastically besides making 
the effect of the stability and growth pact insignificant. This is not very surprising as this 
variable is close to constant and is therefore unlikely to be the cause of changes from one year 
to the next, besides the year they join. As these permanent features are one of the main 
interests in the study this variable was not included in the final analysis, but it is unlikely that 
autocorrelation has significantly alter the results. 
 
3.7.4 Non-linear relationships 
The focus of this study is how deficit levels have differed between democratic countries, and 
how various political factors affect those deficits. These explanatory variables might affect the 
deficit levels in a non-linear way. As there are 26 time points in the analysis it is possible to 
include complex non-linear predictors (Singer and Willett 2003: 217). To test whether the 
change over time is linear the residuals can be plotted against the dependent variable 
(Sarakisian 2007). This plot does not seem to indicate non-linear relationships however and 
the value which indicates change over time is therefore included with a rise of one for each 
year. 
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4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES 
In this chapter the operationalization of the variables will be presented. After presenting the 
dependent variable and the countries included in the study the economic, political and societal 
variables are presented. 
 
4.1 Net government deficits/surpluses 
There has been some controversy over the way government deficits have been defined in 
previous research. Volkerink and de Haan (2001: 222) criticized previous research (for 
instance Roubini and Sachs 1989a ; 1989b) for analyzing general government deficits while 
the theoretical focus is on central government deficits. In some countries there is a clear 
separation between the fiscal policy at the national and sub-national level and it can therefore 
not be expected that explanatory variables at the national level explains fiscal policy for both 
national and sub-national political institutions. I therefore use data for central government 
deficits. By denoting the value as a percentage of GDP the data becomes comparable between 
all the countries despite vast differences in the size and form of their economies. 
 
IMF’s data for “central government deficit/surplus” (IMF 1991 ; 1994 ; 2007) was used as the 
basis for the dependent variable. The variable is created by subtracting central government 
expenditure from central government revenue for each year and denotes the result as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP.  This data has the advantage of covering countries outside 
of the OECD, which have been the focus of most previous studies and of covering a longer 
time-period than most other data. For the OECD countries data from OECD.stat (2010) is 
used for the period between 1995 and 2006 because the IMF data have big gaps in their data 
for these countries in this period. It would be preferable to only have data from one source, 
but they should be comparable as both are calculated with the same method1. This analysis is 
therefore wider in both the number of countries and years covered than most previous 
research within this field. The analyses cover 47 electoral democracies in the period between 
1980 and 2006, and the countries are dropped from the study in the years when they are not 
considered to be democratic enough. In addition to the inclusion of all the OECD countries 
electoral democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and North America are 
studied.  
                                                 
1
 The UN System of National Accounts 1993: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/introduction.asp. A visual 
inspection also showed that the models matched in the years when they overlapped. 
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4.2 Electoral democracies 
An electoral democracy is defined as a country with a score of three, two or one on Freedom 
Houses “political rights” index where 1 signifies most free and 7 signifies least free. This 
index focuses on whether citizens have the possibility to choose freely and run in elections 
and whether the candidates voted into political office has a decisive impact on policy 
formulation. The focus is on the institutional aspects of democracies. Having a satisfactory 
score on this variable does not necessarily mean that the countries are liberal democracies 
with all the civil liberties that entail. Followingly, some countries are included in the study in 
years when they are only considered partly free by Freedom House. The countries are dropped 
in all years when they are not deemed electoral democracies2 and this gives an N of 1074. 
 
4.3 Economic explanations 
In this part it will be shown how the economic explanations were operationalized. These were: 
the growth rate of the economy, the openness of the economy and the inflation level. 
 
4.3.1 Growth rate of the economy 
I use the real GDP growth rate 3  as a measure of the growth rate of the economy. 
Unemployment levels could also have been used to measure the phenomenon, but it is hard 
finding sources were unemployment figures is available for all the years covered in the 
research. The GDP growth is also the measure used in most previous research and therefore 
well suited to control whether previous findings are reliable. 
 
                                                 
2
 The countries covered in the study are (if they have not been electoral democracies throughout the study the 
years included are in parenthesis): Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh (1980-81, 1991-2001 and 2005-
2006), Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria (1990-2006), Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic (1993-2006), Denmark, 
Estonia (1991-2006), Finland, France, Germany (West Germany until 1990), Greece, Hungary (1990-2006), 
Iceland, India (1980-1992 and 1996-2006), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea (1988-2006), 
Latvia (1991-2006), Lithuania (1991-2006), Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico (1980-84, 1988 and 1997-2006), 
Namibia (1990-2006), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland (1990-2006), Portugal, Romania (1996-
2006), Slovakia (1993-2006), Slovenia (1991-2006), Spain, Sri Lanka (1980-1988 and 1996-2006), Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey (1984-1992 and 2002-06), the United Kingdom and the United States. 
3
 This variable is taken from USDA (2009) which again is based on data from: the World Bank World 
Development Indicators, the International Financial Statistics of the IMF, Global Insight, Oxford Economic 
Forecasting and the Economic Research Service. 
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4.3.2 Openness of the economy 
Imports plus exports as a proportion of the GDP in constant 1990 prices is used to measure 
the openness of the economy4. No country has the value zero and the lowest value is 14.43, 
for the USA in 1982. 100 was therefore withdrawn from each value to get a natural zero value. 
This operationalization was chosen over other possible measures of openness of the economy, 
such as capital flow and foreign direct investment because it has been the most widely used in 
the past. 
 
4.3.3 Inflation 
Inflation is operationalized as the annual percentage change in the GDP deflator5. The GDP 
deflator shows the difference between the nominal and real GDP (Burtini 2009), and is “the 
most general measure of overall price change” (WBSM 2010). It includes all the sections of 
the economy in the calculations and is therefore better at including new goods and services 
than the consumer price index.  
 
This variable has some extremely high values however. The mean is 14, but the standard 
deviation is 62 and the highest value is 949 (for Bulgaria in 1997). These extreme outliers 
have a disproportionate influence on the effects of the variable in the analysis. The highest 
values were therefore recoded to make the variable more normally distributed (although it still 
has a tail at the right side). More precisely, the units that originally had a value of 20 or lower 
kept their original values, the values between 20 and 25 were given the value 20, the values 
between 25 and 30 the value 21, then each ten percentage increase in inflation meant an 
increase by one in the inflation variable up to the value 100. Then each increase by a hundred 
corresponds with an increase in one in the recoded variable, and all values above 500 are 
given the value 35. Most units then retain their original value. This new variable is therefore 
meant to show the difference between different levels of inflation, but at the same time not let 
the few outliers be the only determinant of the effect. It does however make it harder to 
interpret the coefficient. 
 
                                                 
4These data are taken from the “Quality of Government” dataset (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/), the variable used 
was unna_otco which is based on data from the UN statistical division 
5
 Inflation data is taken from WBWDI (2010). 
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4.4 Political explanations 
In this part it will be shown how the political explanations were operationalized. These were: 
the number of parties involved in governing, the majority status of the government, the 
government’s ideology, the electoral system, the form of executive (presidential or 
parliamentary), the effect of the stability and growth pact and the European Monetary Fund, 
the effect of elections and the quality of government. 
 
4.4.1 Number of parties 
Previous research has categorized the number of parties in government in several ways. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a ; 1989b), who were the first to look at what effect it might have on 
fiscal policy, categorized government types into four categories as the basis of their 
exploration of how political factor influenced fiscal policy:  (1) one-party majority, (2)  two-
party majority, (3) three or more parties majority and (4) minority governments. This 
categorization is however unnecessarily imprecise both because it is possible to create a more 
fine grained categorization of the number of parties in cabinet and because it treats the two 
theoretically distinct phenomenon of the number of parties in government and the 
governments majority status as one. The second issue will be further commented on in the 
next section on minority and majority governments. 
 
Coalition governments vary greatly, both in the number of parties participating and in the 
relative strength of these parties. A two-party government where one of the parties dominates 
should be expected to perform more like a one-party government than a government where 
there are two equal partners as the larger party probably will not have to compromise its 
program as much. Many Japanese governments have for instance formally been coalition 
governments as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been joined by one other party which 
has controlled one or two ministries. The LDP’s dominance has however been overwhelming 
and a measurement of the number of parties in government should consequentially be able to 
distinguish these cabinets from e.g. the “grand coalitions” in Germany that have included two 
parties that are approximately equally strong. To categorize parliamentary countries a variable 
was created based on Laakso and Taagerpera’s (1979) measure of effective number of parties. 
This should be able to indicate both the number of parties and their relative strength. Semi-
presidential and presidential countries are somewhat more difficult to categorize in this way 
and how it is done is showed below. The variable was calculated from this formula:  
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i
ENCP  
ENCP is the effective number of cabinet parties and pi is the ith party’s fraction of ministers 
in government6.  The proportion of ministers works as a proxy for the relative power of each 
party and should therefore indicate whether decisions has to be made by compromise among 
equal partners, which is claimed by many to increase the chances of deficits, or whether one 
(or more) party (or parties) dominate. 
 
All governments in presidential systems are considered as one-party governments even 
though they at times can have members from a different party than the one the president 
belongs to. This makes it difficult to categorize semi-presidential systems, and these 
difficulties are addressed below. Parliamentary and presidential cabinets function quite 
differently:  
 “Parliamentary executives are collegial cabinets, whereas presidential executives are 
 one-person executives; in presidential systems, executive power is concentrated in the 
 president, and his or her cabinet consists of advisers to the president instead of more 
 or less coequal participants” (Lijphart 1999: 105). 
This means that even though it no doubt matters what kind of advisers the president has, 
having ministers from different parties does not mean that there is a division of power 
between these parties in the same way as it does in parliamentary systems. The ultimate 
decision making power is only held by the president and his party can be expected to both 
                                                 
6
 These data are taken from: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000), Bille (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 
2006 ; 2007), Carty (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), De Winter and Dumont (2006), Delgado 
and Nieto (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Diskin (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 
2007), Dumont and Hirsch (2003), Dumont and Poirier (2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Dumont and Winter (2002), 
Fallend (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Faustmann and Kaymak (2007), Fenech (2001 ; 2002 ; 
2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Fink-Hafner (2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Fisher (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 
2004), Fisher (2006 ; 2007), Fisher and Smith (2005), Hardarson and Kristinsson (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 
2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Hardmeier (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004), Ignazi (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 
2007), Ikstens (2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2007), Ilonszki and Kurtán (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 
2007), Jānis (2006), Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Kato 
(2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006), Katz (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Ker-Lindsay 
and Webb (2004 ; 2005 ; 2006), Krupavicius (2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Linek (2005 ; 2006 ; 
2007), Lucardie (2001 ; 2003 ; 2007), Lucardie and Voerman (2002 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006), Lukáš (2002 ; 2003), 
Lukáš and Mansfeldová (2004), Milic (2005 ; 2006), O'Malley (2006 ; 2007), O'Malley and Marsh (2001 ; 2002 
; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005), Pettai (2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Poguntke (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 
2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Rihoux et al. (2005), Rihoux et al. (2003 ; 2004), Rihoux et al. (2007), Rihoux, Dumont and 
Dandoy (2001), Rihoux et al. (2002), Sidler (2007), Spirova (2007), Stan and Zaharia (2007), Sundberg (2001 ; 
2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Učeň (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006), Vowles (2001 ; 2002 ; 
2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Widfeldt (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Ysmal (2001 ; 
2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2006 ; 2007), Aalberg (2001 ; 2002 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2005 ; 2007), Aalberg and 
Brekken (2006) 
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reap the awards of popular policies and be punished for unpopular ones. Followingly, the 
incentives that have been claimed to produce higher debt in multiparty cabinets, such as 
pressures from different social groups that form the core-constituencies of the participating 
parties, function differently in presidential systems. The three presidential systems covered in 
the analysis, Cyprus, Mexico and the USA, are therefore coded as having one party in 
government throughout the period covered. 
 
Most other countries covered in the study are clearly parliamentary, with a ceremonial king, 
queen or president and power vested in a government elected by parliament. There are 
however some semi-presidential countries in the sample which have similarities to both 
presidential and parliamentarian systems in the way they function and are therefore harder to 
place. Some countries are formally semi-presidential, but with presidents that are little more 
than figureheads or at least much less powerful than the prime-minister. In these countries 
“political practice is parliamentary” (Duverger 1980: 167), and they are therefore treated as 
any other parliamentary country. In this study Austria, Botswana7, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia falls in this group (Lijphart 1999: 121-122; Siaroff 2003 ; 
Elgie 2005: 105-107). They are therefore treated as parliamentary in the analysis8 . Four 
countries have gone from systems where the president has some co-decision powers  over 
important legislation to being largely ceremonial in the period covered by the study: Finland 
(where presidential powers where first reduced in 1994 and then reduced further in 2000), 
Poland (in 1997) and Portugal (in 1982) (Siaroff 2003: 299-300). I treat these countries as 
parliamentary for the entire period both for simplicity and because presidential powers was 
strongest in foreign policy which has a smaller impact on fiscal policy than domestic policy. 
On the other end of the scale are semi-presidential countries where the presidency is clearly 
the dominant political institution. Namibia, South Korea and Sri Lanka fall into this category. 
In these countries the prime minister and the government are not accountable to the 
parliament and executive power is therefore concentrated in the presidency (Siaroff 2003 ; 
Elgie 2005: 102-105). These countries are therefore treated as presidential and denoted as 
having one government party through the entire period covered. 
 
                                                 
7
 In Botswana the head of government is also head of state and holds the title president. His government needs 
the support of parliament however and the political system functions like parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1999: 
117). 
8
 Countries where the president does not have significant powers and is not directly elected, such as Germany, 
are also treated as parliamentary. 
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The most difficult countries to categorize are France and Romania. France and Romania have 
independently elected presidents with significant powers, but also an influential government 
that needs the support of parliament. In France's case Duverger (1980) therefore claimed that 
the system would function as a presidential systems when the same party held the presidency 
and had a majority in parliament and as a parliamentary system under cohabitation when the 
presidents party did not have a majority in parliament. I nonetheless treat these countries as 
parliamentary for the entire period because the possibility of a threat of no-confidence makes 
it important for the government to have a majority in parliament. The ability to threaten no-
confidence should give all participating parties more power than they have in presidential 
systems. There the ministers just function as advisers to the president, and support of their 
party is not vital for the survival of the government.  
 
Finally, Switzerland is in some ways neither parliamentary nor presidential. The system 
functioning is however similar to that of parliamentary systems (Siaroff 2003: 306) and it is 
consequentially treated as parliamentary. 
 
It was also tested whether the effective number of parties in parliament (ENPP)9 influences 
fiscal policy. This makes it possible to see if it affects fiscal policy whether the government 
has to work with many or few parties in government. The variable was calculated based on 
the same formula as the effective number of cabinet parties, but instead of using the 
proportion of cabinet ministers belonging to each party as the basis for the calculations the 
fractions of seats in parliament controlled by each party was used. This measure is preferable 
to just counting the number of parties in parliament because it focuses on the parties that are 
big enough to influence policy, and limits the effect of small parties which are likely to have a 
more limited effect on policy formation.  
 
Democracies can necessarily not have less than one party in government or parliament (except 
during technocratic transitional governments). This makes the value zero meaningless, and it 
is consequentially harder to interpret the results of the analysis. To compensate for this one 
was subtracted from each value of ENCP and ENPP. The countries with one effective party in 
government got the value zero, countries with 2.5 effective parties 1.5 etc. This does not 
affect the results or the significance levels of the variables. 
                                                 
9
 Data for ENPP are taken from Gallagher and Mitchell (2005), and calculated based on data from IPU (2010) 
for the countries and years not covered by them. 
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4.4.2 Minority or majority government 
As mentioned above, some previous studies have incorporated the governments’ majority 
status and the number of participating parties in cabinet in the same variable. This is 
misleading both because it treats two theoretically distinct concepts as one and because it 
might prevent the researcher from identifying which phenomenon that determines the value of 
the dependent variable. According to Strøm (1990) minority governments is a different 
phenomenon than coalition governments, arise under different circumstances and have 
different consequences.  He furthermore claims that it might be easier for them to push 
through a coherent program than for majority coalition governments because the governing 
party or parties are free to create different legislative majority at different times. This might 
make them able to lead a more stringent fiscal policy and reduce the deficits. Finally, by 
registering the effective number of parties and the majority status of the government in two 
different variables it is possible to distinguish between one-party and multiparty minority 
governments. This is not an uncommon phenomenon. In the data used in this analysis 26 
percent of the units had minority governments and 72 percent of these minority governments 
had more than one participating party. 
 
The status of the government vis-à-vis parliament is measured as the proportion of seats the 
government party or parties has in the legislature10. All parties with at least one minister in 
cabinet were considered government members. This might be slightly misleading as some 
government might have formal support agreements with parties without ministries. This 
would offer the government almost certain parliamentary majorities and thereby make it 
function very much like a majority government (Strøm 1990: 61-62). It is however difficult to 
determine which parties fall into this category as there is a blurry line between this 
phenomenon and the natural operational behavior where minority governments cooperate 
more with some ideologically familiar parties than with other parties. In countries that are 
considered presidential the proportion of parliamentarians belonging to the presidential party 
was measured. This is consistent with the operationalization of the number of parties in 
government in presidential systems. 
 
                                                 
10
 Data on the composition of parliaments is from IPU (2010) 
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The influence of the government’s majority status on fiscal policy is tested for using two 
variables. The first variables used has values between -.5 and .5 where  -.5 signifies that the 
governing parties have no seats in parliament, .5 that all the representatives in parliament 
belong to the governing parties. Zero indicates that they control exactly half the seats in 
parliament. This variable was used because it was expected to be easier for governments to 
get their agenda trough the bigger their majority is, and harder the larger their minority. The 
second variable was used to find out whether the main difference is between majority and 
minority status and the size of those minorities and majorities is less influential on fiscal 
policy. In this variable all governments with 50 percent or less of the parliamentarians is 
given the value zero and all governments with 50 percent plus one or more is given the value 
one. It was afterwards tested which model explained the dependent variable best to find out 
which variable would be kept in the final explanatory model. 
 
4.4.3 Ideology of government 
The ideology of the government is measured in two variables based on three categorizations 
of parties: left, centre and right. Categorizing parties into ideologies across time and in 
different countries is complicated and demands a certain degree of personal judgment. 
Categorization was primarily based the parties' affiliation to an international party group. 
Most major European parties are members of pan-European parties in the European 
Parliament. The parties that belong to the Party of European Socialists or Party of the 
European Left were coded as left-wing and parties that are members of the European Peoples 
Party or parties further to the right, such as Union for a Europe of the Nations, as right-wing. 
Liberals and Greens were considered centre-parties and neither categorized as right- or left-
wing. Non-European parties also often belong to international party-groups such as the 
conservative International Democrat Union and the social democratic Socialist International 
and were following coded based on these affiliations. These affiliations might in some cases 
say more about the history of the parties than their current views, but in most cases they 
indicate where they stand in the political spectrum, at least within their national political 
systems. Parties without international affiliations where placed in the ideological group that 
seemed most in line with their policy views as judged by the researcher. In coalition 
governments the value on the variable was based on each party’s fraction of ministers. Two 
variables were created, one for the proportion of ministers belonging to left-wing or centre 
parties and one for the proportion belonging to right-wing or centre parties. The centre-left 
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variable varies between zero, if no ministers belong to left-wing or centre parties, and one, if 
all the ministers belong to these parties. The opposite is the case for the centre-right variable. 
These variables were entered in separate models to see if there was something about either 
right-wing or left-wing parties that made them take up higher debts than other types of parties 
when they were in government.  
 
4.4.4 Fiscal illusions 
To test whether governments increase spending without increasing taxes in election years to 
increase their support among voters a  dummy-variable was made that has the value one in 
election years and the value zero in non-election years11. 
 
4.4.5 EU stability and growth pact and the European Monetary Union 
A dummy variable was introduced for membership in the stability and growth pact (SGP), 
which gives the countries the value one fore the years they were members and zero for the 
years they were not. All countries that are members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
are registered as members of the SGP from 1999, which is the year the treaty pact entered into 
force, or the year they joined the SGP until the end of the dataset.  
 
Debrun et al. (2008) does however find that the countries were more affected by the fiscal 
stringency required for entering the EMU than by the SGP which was supposed to prevent 
large deficits after they were allowed as members. A different variable is therefore created for 
the accession period to the European Monetary Union. This has the value one during this 
period and zero afterwards. Countries that were members of the EU in 1992, except the 
United Kingdom and Denmark, are defined as in the accession period from 1992, when the 
EMU accession criteria was stipulated as part of the Maastricht treaty, until the SGP entered 
into force in 1999. Countries that joined the EU later are included in this variable from the 
year they joined until they joined the euro or until the end of the dataset (Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 
2007: 7-8). Denmark and the UK are excluded from this variable because they opted out of 
this part of the Maastricht Treaty. Greece is included in this variable until 2000 because they 
were only accepted as euro and SGP-members in 2001. Sweden did sign this part of the treaty, 
but did not join the euro when the other countries did. It is however obliged to try to join the 
monetary union and is formally not a member because it has not met the entry criteria, even 
                                                 
11Data on elections is taken from IPU (2010). 
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though the real reason is probably opposition from the electorate (Holden 2009). It is 
nevertheless coded as being in the lead-up to membership from 1992 until the end of the 
dataset as that is the country’s formal status and it is likely that the political elites tries not to 
diverge to far from the entry demands  as they are in general very favorable to EMU-
membership (Lindahl and Naurin 2005). 
 
To control for the claim that the stability and growth pact has more of an influence on small 
than large members a measure of country size was needed. This measure was based on the 
population size12, but since there are some extreme outliers (India is more than three times as 
large as the second largest country, the USA) the natural logarithm of the population number 
in 100,000’s was used. These values are thereby relatively normally distributed and the 
outliers do not influence the results unproportionally. As the result needed to be introduced at 
level-2 the mean was the logarithms for each country was used. Finally the lowest value, 
12.48, was withdrawn from each value to get a minimum of zero and an easily interpretable 
intercept. 
 
4.4.6 Geography of representation 
To test for whether countries with smaller constituencies have higher deficits than countries 
with multi-member constituencies two variables were created. The first variable’s values were 
calculated from this equation: 
1−=
ciesconstituen
ariansparliamentN  
The value therefore indicates the average number of parliamentarians elected in each 
constituency13.. As all constituencies will at least elect one member to the legislature one was 
subtracted from each value to get a meaningful base point. Countries with single member 
constituencies will therefore get the value one and countries with one constituency for the 
whole country and 150 parliamentary seats will get the value 149. The size of constituencies 
in each country varies to a very limited degree and the variable was therefore calculated as a 
constant based on the last election before 2006, which is the last year covered in the study. It 
is therefore included in the level-2 of the two-level model. 
 
                                                 
12
 Population size data are taken from the “Quality of government” dataset (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/) and based 
on data from the UN statistical divisions national accounts. 
13
 Data on constituencies and the size of the parliaments is taken from IPU (2010). 
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The same phenomenon was also tested using a dummy for majoritarian electoral systems. 
This is because the important difference might be between proportional and majoritarian or 
plurality electoral systems and it might therefore be unreasonable that there is a major 
difference between proportional systems with large and small electoral districts. Most 
countries included are clearly either proportional or plurality/majority systems which were 
considered as majoritarian electoral systems.  
 
Some mixed electoral systems with similarities to both of these major groups are also 
included in the analysis however and these are harder to categorize. Some authors have just 
seen these systems as a subgroup of proportional systems (Lakeman and Lambert 1955 ; 
Reynolds and Reilly 1997). This is an unnecessarily imprecise generalization however as 
there are great differences between mixed systems and some are closest to proportional 
systems while other are more alike majoritarian or plurality systems. The evaluation of where 
to put individual countries therefore has to be made on a case-to case basis.  
 
The countries included in the study that has legislators elected by some combination of 
proportional and majoritarian or plurality methods are: Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, South-Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania and Switzerland (IPU 2010). 
Finland and Switzerland can clearly be designated as proportional and South-Korea as 
majoritarian as 15 percent or less of deputies were elected under the alternative rules in these 
countries (Massicotte and Blais 1999: 345, 351). Germany, Italy, Mexico and New Zealand 
are what Massicotte and Blais (1999: 353) calls corrective mixed systems meaning that the 
“PR seats are distributed so as to correct the distortions created by plurality or majority rule”. 
These systems are therefore expected to create more proportional results than what is 
expected in strict majoritarian systems, but they are nevertheless systems where most 
legislators are elected in one-man constituencies. It was exactly this characteristic that was 
expected to make fiscal deficits higher in majoritarian than in proportional systems because 
politicians overestimated the benefits to their constituencies ahead of the benefits to the 
country as a whole (Alesina and Perotti 1995 ; Persson and Tabellini 1999). These countries 
are therefore coded as majoritarian. This is a bit problematic for Italy which adopted this 
system in 1993 and had a proportional system before that, but they are nevertheless placed in 
this group because they had a mixed system for the greatest portion of the time covered. In 
Japan most deputies are elected under majoritarian rules and hence the country is coded as 
such. In Hungary a majority is elected under PR and that country is therefore coded as 
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proportional. Lithuania is very hard to code as it has an equal number of parliamentarians 
elected under proportional and majoritarian rules. A choice had to be made however and it 
was coded as proportional since mixed systems usually have been seen as having more in 
common with proportional than majoritarian systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999). 
 
4.4.7 Presidential vs. parliamentary systems 
Presidential regimes are controlled for using a dummy that has the value one in presidential 
countries and the value zero in parliamentary countries. For semi-presidential countries that 
have some of the characteristics of both of these systems the same categorization argued for in 
the categorization of effective number of cabinet parties is used (see part 4.4.1 Number of 
parties). Cyprus, Mexico, Namibia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and the USA are therefore 
considered presidential, while all other countries included in the analysis are coded as 
parliamentary. This variable is constant over time for the countries. 
 
4.4.8 Quality of Government 
To measure the quality of government a variable created by the Quality of Government 
institute14 and based on data from the International Country Risk Guide15 was used. The basis 
for their definition of quality of government is taken from Kaufman Kraay and Zoido-Lebatón 
(1999) who defines it as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised”. This concept includes: “(1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
1999: 1). This makes the concept similar to, but distinct from, measures of democratic quality 
(Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008). All the countries included in the analysis have a 
minimum of democratic institutions and how democratic the countries are is therefore less 
interesting as an explanatory variable. 
 
 The variable is created from measures of (1) corruption levels, (2) the strength of law and 
order and (3) the bureaucracy quality. The corruption variable includes evaluations of low 
scale corruption in civil society, but is primarily meant to measure: “actual or potential 
                                                 
14
 www.qog.pol.gu.se 
15
 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
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corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business” (Teorell et al. 
2009b: 50). The law and order part of the law and order variable are assessed separately. “The 
Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law” (Teorell et 
al. 2009b: 51). Bureaucracies are seen as institutions that can cushion the political changes at 
the top, and countries are therefore considered to have high bureaucracy quality when: “the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services” (Teorell et al. 2009b: 51). Corruption and “Law and 
order” each account for 3/8 of the combined variable and bureaucracy quality for the last 2/8. 
The variable is measured between one and zero where one indicates the highest possible 
government quality. 
 
Again countries are given their average value for the years when they were judged as electoral 
democracies as their constant value on this variable. For most countries variation over time is 
quite limited and the results are usually not very different from their time varying value. The 
original variable only covers the years between 1984 and 2006 and the calculations are 
therefore based on these years. In the study Finland has the highest value at .998 and is 
therefore judged as having the highest government quality and Bangladesh has the lowest 
value at .343. Again the variable does not have any real possibility of reaching the value zero 
and 0.5 was therefore withdrawn from each value to get such values.  
 
4.5 Societal explanations 
The current economic and political condition of a country can affect the fiscal policy, but it 
might be that these affects are modified by more permanent societal factors in society. Several 
variables that could be expected to have such an influence were therefore included in the 
level-2 of the model. In this part operationalizations of political instability, economic and 
social inequality and the proportion the population which is elderly is presented.  
 
4.5.1 Political instability 
Political instability is a phenomenon that is difficult to measure quantitatively, and in this 
analysis the variable must measure both violent and non-violent challenges to the government 
that might affect the political climate which fiscal policy is made within. The variable used is 
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therefore based on a count of the number of political assassinations, general strikes, instances 
of guerrilla warfare, government crisis, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations 
in each year16 . Assassinations are defined as politically motivated murders or attempted 
murders of high government official or politicians; General strikes are defined as politically 
motivated strikes with more than 1000 participants; Guerrilla warfare is defined as violent 
activity by independent groups aimed at the overthrow of government; Government crisis’ are 
situations that risk overthrowing the current regime; Riots are violent clashes of more than 
100 citizens; revolutions attempted or successful forced changes to the government elite or 
rebellions for independence from the central government and anti-government demonstrations 
are peaceful protests against the government with more than 100 participants (Banks 2004).  
This variable is problematic because it counts anti-government protest and guerrilla warfare 
as if they were equally damaging to political stability. The alternatives are however not any 
better. When you are trying to measure both violent and non-violent opposition to the 
government in the same variable it is very difficult to weight the different components against 
each other. The variable indicates whether the country has a stable political climate where 
governments are only challenged through elections and in the legislature or whether they face 
more constant challenges from outside the parliament. 
 
The number of these instances can be expected to be influenced by the size of the country 
however. This was controlled for using a measure of population size. This formula was the 
basis of the countries' values: 
)100000ln( spop
yinstabilit
yinstabilit i=  
The number of instances of instability in the country is divided with the natural logarithm of 
the population in hundred thousands17. The variable therefore does not measure the individual 
instances of protest that might have short term consequences for policy formulation, but the 
propensity of the society to be unstable. The more unstable the countries are the shorter the 
perspective of politicians who fear for their survival is expected to be. This creates a variable 
that varies between zero for the Bahamas and Slovenia and 1.89 for Israel and 1.76 for India. 
The countries were given constant values throughout the study based on their average in the 
                                                 
16
 Data are taken from Norris (2009) who based her data on Banks (2004) who has recorded instances mentioned 
in the New York Times. 
17
 Population size data are taken from the “Quality of government” dataset (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/) and based 
on data from the UN statistical divisions national accounts. 
 49  
years they were deemed electoral democracies and the variable was included in the level-2 of 
the analysis. 
 
4.5.2 Economic and social inequality 
Another permanent source of instability in a political system can be created by great social or 
economic differences. The measure of social fractionalization is created by Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003). The variable reports the racial and 
linguistic fractionalization in the country and was calculated according to the following 
formula: 
∑
=
−=
N
i
ijj sizationFractional
1
21
 
Here sij is group is share of the population in country j. A country with only one ethnic and 
linguistic group therefore gets the value one and when one was withdrawn the lowest possible 
value became zero. In this study the countries values vary between .002 for South Korea 
and .712 for Canada18. By combining ethnic and linguistic characteristics in one variable it is 
easier to operationalize since these concepts are overlapping many places (Alesina et al. 2003: 
159). The ethnic composition of a country changes very slowly and the countries are given 
constant values. The variable is included in level-2 of the study. 
 
Data for economic inequality are based on the Gini index19. Gini levels can in theory vary 
between zero (if income was equally spread between all the countries inhabitants) and 100 (if 
one person got all the income in one country). In the study the mean levels for the included 
countries varies between 24.1 for Sweden and 73.9 for Namibia. The countries are given 
stable values based on the average of their high-quality observations for the period as defined 
in “the World Income Inequality Database”.  
 
The economic differences for countries vary over time and it could therefore be argued that it 
would have been better to let the variable vary over time. I choose not do this for two reasons 
however. One, there is a serious lack of reliable data, and most countries have high quality 
Gini data for less than half the years covered in the study. Letting the variable vary over time 
will therefore lead to a loss of data and consequentially weaker predictions. Furthermore, as 
                                                 
18
 Data on ethnic fractionalization was taken from (Norris 2009) who based her data on (Alesina et al. 2003) 
19
 Gini data are taken from Teorell et.al. (2009b) who base their data on UNU-WIDER (2008)  
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argued above differences in society might not affect the conflict level and political processes 
instantly, but rather over time by increasing the differences between political choices and 
making it harder to find coherent compromises. This might again increase the fiscal deficit.  
 
As no country has the value zero, and this is a very unlikely situation to ever arise as it would 
mean absolute equality of income, 50 were withdrawn from each value. This gives the 
possibility of reaching the value zero and therefore makes it easier to interpret the intercept.  
 
4.5.3 Age distribution of population 
The share of the population over the age 65 is used as a measurement of the share of old 
people in the population. Data for the variable is taken from the UN’s World Population 
Prospects (UNPD 2009). The variable is constant for the countries over the period. This is 
both because there is very little variation in the values over time and because they are only 
published every fifth year. The countries are therefore given their average for the years they 
are included in the study as their value. Botswana, where 2.7 percent of the population is 
above 65 has the lowest value on this variable. 2.7 is therefore subtracted from all the values 
on this value to get zero as the base value and thereby make interpretation easier.  
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5 ANALYSIS 
In this chapter descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables is first 
presented. Afterwards the pre-analysis, which serves as a benchmark for the subsequent 
analyses, is run. Then the explanatory models are presented. These become increasingly 
complex and get increasing explanatory power as significant variables are kept and new added. 
Finally the findings are evaluated against the hypotheses. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before the results of the two-level analysis are presented, the variables and countries included 
in the analysis are explored. First the variance between the countries in their values on the 
dependent variable, net budget surplus as a percentage of GDP, is presented and then the 
variance in the other variables is explored 
5.1.1 Dependent variable  
As can be seen in table 5-1 there is considerable variation in the mean deficit levels of the 
countries included in the analysis. They vary from an average deficit of 10.4 percent of GDP 
in Greece to an average surplus of 8.7 in Botswana, a country with a fiscal policy that has 
been “prudent in the extreme” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003), and 3.5 in Norway. 
These two countries become outliers in the analysis and the model can not explain 
satisfactorily why their surpluses are unusually high. In the analysis it is examined how this 
affects the results. Most countries included in the study have negative averages and some 
variation over time around this average. 
There is also considerable variation between the countries in the number of years where there 
is information about net surpluses. This is partly because countries are only included in years 
when they were deemed electoral democracies and countries that were not stable democracies 
throughout the period covered are therefore excluded for some years. There is however also 
lacking data for years when countries fulfilled the democracy criterion. This is especially 
grave for the developing countries included. One therefore has to be somewhat careful in 
generalizing the results for developing countries. The analysis is nevertheless broader than 
most previous research on the topic as it includes several new democracies, especially in 
Eastern and Central Europe, which have not been included in most previous research. 
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Table 5-1: Net surplus in the countries included in the study in the years 1980-2006 
Country Min Max Mean S.D.20 N Country Min Max Mean S.D.20 N 
Australia -4.1 2.2 -.47 1.90 27 Japan -5.7 1.7 -2.52 2.33 10 
Austria -6.0 -.8 -3.52 1.68 25 S. Korea -1.6 5.1 1.13 1.67 18 
Bahamas -1.9 1.8 -4.03 1.62 15 Latvia -4.2 1.8 -1.50 1.63 13 
Bangladesh -3.2 2.5 -.44 2.85 3 Lithuania -5.2 .0 -1.92 1.54 10 
Belgium -13.1 .3 -5.09 4.41 27 Luxembourg -11.7 10.4 2.07 4.04 26 
Botswana -2.3 19.9 8.67 6.78 13 Malta -9.8 1.6 -3.74 3.04 25 
Bulgaria -15.4 3.4 -2.69 5.31 17 Mexico -15.4 10.2 -3.62 6.59 10 
Canada -6.4 1.6 -2.13 2.74 27 Namibia -5.4 -1.2 -3.47 1.90 4 
Cyprus -9.2 -1.0 -4.37 1.99 25 Netherlands -7.8 2.1 -2.98 2.69 26 
Czech Rep. -6.0 2.7 -2.29 2.47 14 N. Zealand -9.3 5.1 -1.09 4.77 20 
Denmark -8.1 5.1 -.39 3.56 27 Norway -6.5 17.8 3.48 6.18 26 
Estonia -2.1 2.5 .20 1.38 9 Poland -5.5 1.9 -3.47 1.42 13 
Finland -14.7 5.9 -1.63 5.52 27 Portugal -14.8 -.0 -6.07 3.88 27 
France -6.6 -.1 -2.98 1.47 26 Romania -4.5 .0 -2.87 1.64 10 
Germany -2.4 1.4 -1.55 .83 24 Slovakia -9.6 -.2 -3.77 2.59 11 
Greece -28.9 1.4 -10.4 8.3 24 Slovenia -2.7 .5 -.89 .79 14 
Hungary -8.7 .8 -5.23 2.65 17 Spain -8.4 1.9 -3.42 2.94 26 
Iceland -5.1 6.1 -1.3 2.9 27 Sri Lanka -18.3 -4.5 -10.0 3.63 13 
India -9.3 -2.7 -5.62 2.10 24 Sweden -14.9 4.8 -3.97 5.49 23 
Ireland -14.8 2.7 -4.55 5.90 24 Switzerland -2.8 2.3 -.52 1.02 20 
Israel -19.6 .7 -5.89 5.14 27 Turkey -10.0 -3 -4.93 2.32 9 
Italy -14.9 -.5 -7.81 4.51 27 UK -6.5 1.7 -2.31 2.44 27 
Jamaica -18.3 -1.2 -7.6 5.2 15 USA -6.2 2.3 -2.75 2.18 27 
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 Standard deviation 
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5.1.2 Explanatory variables 
In this part the descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables will be 
examined. In table 5-2 the minimum and maximum values for each variable is presented, as 
well as their mean, standard deviation and the number of units where information was 
available. For the level-1 units the highest possible N was 1061, while it was 46 for the level-
2 units. All the second level variables had data on all the countries. 
 
Table 5-2: Explanatory statistics for the variables included in the study between 1980 and 2006 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.21 N 
Dependent variable      
Surplus/ Deficit -28.91 19.90 -2.90 4.85 889 
 
Economic variables 
     
GDP growth -34.86 15.25 3.09 3.54 1061 
Trade -85.57 177.47 -7.58 49.92 1061 
Inflation -1.88 35.00 7.16 7.37 1053 
 
Political variables 
     
ENCP 0 4.5 .68 .92 1049 
ENPP 0 9.86 2.39 1.55 1055 
Majority -.34 .5 .07 .14 1052 
Majority dummy 0 1 .74 .44 1052 
Centre-left 0 1 .56 .43 1054 
Centre-right 0 1 .69 .40 1054 
Constituency size* 0 149 11.46 27.26 46 
Majoritarian electoral system* 0 1 .37 .49 46 
Presidential* 0 1 .13 .34 46 
SGP 0 1 .09 .28 1061 
Accession EMU 0 1 .12 .33 1061 
Election 0 1 .27 .45 1061 
Quality of Government* -.16 .50 .26 .18 46 
 
Societal variables 
     
Instability* 0 1.89 .30 .41 46 
Ethnic fractionalization* .00 .71 .27 .20 46 
Gini* -25.92 23.90 -16.12 9.00 46 
Population over 65* .00 14.63 8.77 4.06 46 
 
Slopes-as-outcomes variable 
     
 Population size* .00 8.14 3.59 1.84 46 
* = level-2 variable 
 
The dependent variable, the net surplus as a proportion of the GDP, has a minimum value of -
28.91 for Greece in 1990 and a maximum value of 19.9 for Botswana in 1986. The mean is -
2.91 which means that in the countries included the average budgets are in deficit. The 
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standard deviation is 4.82 which indicate a relatively wide distribution around the mean. 
Finally, the N is 889 indicated that at least 172 units are lost in each computation. 
 
The GDP-growth variable varies between -34.86 for Latvia in 1992 and 15.25 for the same 
country in 2000 with a mean of 3.09 and a standard deviation of 3.52. Despite these outliers, a 
visual inspection of the variable shows that most of the values are between -10 and +10 and 
normally distributed. The trade as a percentage of the GDP variable has a minimum value of 
-85.57 percent and a maximum of 177.47 percent because 100 were withdrawn from each 
value. The average is -7.58 and the standard deviation is 49.92. All the countries have data on 
this variable for all the years included in the study. The recoded inflation variable (see section 
4.3.3) has a minimum value of -1.88 as there in some cases has been a fall in prices and a 
maximum value of 35. The lowest value is Luxembourg’s in 1997. The highest value is given 
to four units which originally had extremely high inflation, Bulgaria in 1997 and the Baltic 
states in 1992. The mean is 7.16 and the standard deviation is 7.37. The variable is close to 
being normally distributed but has a tail towards the higher values. 
 
The Effective Number of Cabinet Parties (ENCP) variable has a minimum value of zero, as 
one is withdrawn from every value. The maximum value is 4.5, for Italy’s centre-left 
government in 2000. The average is 0.68 and the standard deviation 0.92. There is an N of 
1061 and some loss of data. The minimum Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) 
is 0 and the highest number 9.86. Again, one was withdrawn from each value. The extremely 
high maximum number was obtained by Poland’s first post-communist parliament. Jamaica 
has the lowest possible value of zero between 1983 and 1989. The 1983 election was 
boycotted by one of the two major parties and the governing Jamaica Labour party ended up 
being the only party in government. The country was nevertheless deemed an electoral 
democracy according to the criteria described in the previous chapter and hence included in 
the dataset.  The mean effective number of parliamentary parties is 2.39, the standard 
deviation 1.55 and the N 1055. For both ENCP and ENPP most of the missing data points are 
in Eastern European countries just after the fall of communism. This was a time of rapidly 
changing party constellations and it is therefore difficult to get precise information on the 
parties in parliament or government.  
 
The majority variable has a minimum of -0.34, indicating that the government parties had 16 
percent of the parliamentarians and a maximum of 0.5 meaning that, at times, all the 
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parliamentarians have belonged to the governing party or parties. The mean is 0.07, indicating 
a slight majority, and the standard deviation is 0.14. The majority dummy has a mean of .74. 
Accordingly, 74 percent of the units had a majority government. Both the centre-left and 
centre-right variable has a minimum of zero and a maximum of one. The centre-left variable 
has a mean of 0.56 and a standard deviation of 0.43, while the centre-right variable has a 
mean of 0.69 and a standard deviation of 0.4. This indicates that right-wing parties controlled 
a larger share of government ministers than left-wing parties. The election variable is a 
dummy with a mean of 0.27. 
 
The stability and growth pact (SGP) has a mean of 0.09 indicating that nine percent of the 
units are registered as members of the SGP. 12 percent of the units are registered as being in 
the accession process to the EMU. 
 
The constituency size variable is included in the second level of the model and the values do 
not vary within the countries. One is subtracted from each value and the minimum is therefore 
zero. The Netherlands has the highest value at 149. The average is 11.46 and the standard 
deviation is 27.26. The dummy for majoritarian electoral system has a mean of 0.37. 
Accordingly, 37 percent of the countries were coded as having majoritarian electoral systems. 
The presidential variable has a mean of .13 indicating that approximately thirteen percent of 
the units are presidential. In the quality of government variable Bangladesh had the lowest 
value at 0.34, which became -0.16 after 0.5 was withdrawn, and Finland had the highest at 
0.998, which became approximately 0.5. The mean is 0.26 and the variation around this mean 
quite low as the standard deviation is 0.18. 
 
All the societal variables are on the second level of the analysis. The instability variable has a 
minimum of 0 for Slovenia and the Bahamas and a maximum of 1.89 for Israel. The mean is 
however significantly lower than this maximum at 0.3. The standard deviation is 0.41. The 
ethnic fractionalization index has a minimum of 0.002 for South Korea and a maximum of 
0.71 for Canada. Most countries are more ethnically homogenous as the mean is 0.27 and the 
standard deviation 0.2. Sweden originally had the lowest Gini value at 24.08, indicating it is 
the most equal, and Namibia had the highest value at 73.9. 50 were then withdrawn from all 
values, and their score became -25.92 and 23.90 respectively. The average value is -16.12 and 
the standard deviation is relatively small at 9. The minimum value for share of population 
over 65 is zero and the maximum is 14.63. Botswana’s 2.7 was originally the lowest value 
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and therefore subtracted from all values. Sweden originally had the highest value at 17.33 
percent. The average is 8.77 and the standard deviation 4.06 
 
The population variable is only used in the slopes-as-outcomes model (explained in section 
5.4). It measures the logarithm of the countries’ mean population size. The minimum level, 
for Iceland, is zero as the minimum level of the original variable was subtracted from all the 
values. India has the highest value of 8.14. The mean is 3.59 and the standard deviation 1.84. 
 
5.2 Pre-analysis 
In the research question and the theoretical discussion it has been argued that permanent 
features of the countries included in the analysis influences their fiscal policy. Longitudinal 
multilevel analysis is well suited to include these permanent characteristics and might 
therefore be an improvement on previous explanations of the phenomenon. In this part of the 
paper this theoretical arguments will be tested empirically. An unconditional model without 
any explanatory variables will first be constructed. It can serve as a basis of comparison for 
the later models that includes time varying and time constant variables, and make it possible 
to see how much explanatory power those variables have.  
 
5.2.1 The unconditional model 
A trend variable must be introduced into multi-level models that explain variance over time. 
This can be done in several ways, but it should start at the value zero. The most common 
ways to produce linear trend variables is (1) to have the value zero for the first year and 
increase by one for each year, (2) to have the value zero in the middle year and (3) to have the 
value zero in the final year. I have chosen the second option. The year 1993 is therefore the 
base year and given the value zero, 1980 has the value -13 and 2006 the value +13.  
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Table 5-3: The unconditional model 
Fixed effect  Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Average deficit score in 1993 (***) -2.743 .492 .000 
Average growth rate (***)  .215 .038 .000 
Random effects Variance component d.f. Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation
 
    
  Level-1 error 8.808    
Level-2 (between states)     
  State mean initial score (***) 10.225 45 820.59 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .053 45 298.18 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4720.78 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 6 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4726.78  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 6 
 
The average deficit score in 1993 show that on average the countries had surplus that 
constituted    -2.743 percent of the GDP in 1993, in other words: spending exceeded incomes 
by, 2.7 percent of GDP. On average this deficit is expected to rise by 0.215 percent each year. 
Over the 26 years covered in the analysis the average country would therefore be expected to 
reduce its yearly deficit by 5.538 percentage points from -5.547 in 1980 to 0.052 in 2006. 
Both of these values were strongly significant well below the .01-level. The fact that the 
random effect for the trend rate is also significant indicates that the different countries have 
different growth rates. It is therefore interesting to explore which variables might create these 
differences in development (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 165). This general decrease in 
deficits is interesting in itself. Change in deficit trends over time is not unprecedented 
however. It has for instance been shown that OECD-countries significantly increased their 
debt levels in the period after the 1973 oil crisis (Roubini and Sachs 1989a).  
 
The random effect part of the results shows how the individual countries vary around the 
mean levels. The state initial score of 10.225 shows that the states vary greatly around the 
average deficit scores in 1993. The state mean trend rates of 0.053 also show some variation 
around the average growth rate. Both of these values are strongly significant. This indicates 
that countries have different mean levels of deficits and different growth curves. It is therefore 
warranted to explore which factors might cause these differences. Since both the starting 
levels and the growth levels are significant it is interesting to both look at time-constant and 
time varying explanatory variables (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 165-166).  
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5.2.2 Deviance, AIC and number of iterations 
Multilevel software produces statistics in maximum likelihood-estimation to show how well 
the model explains the data. One such measure is the likelihood statistic which is used to 
estimate the deviance. It is obtained by multiplying the natural log of the likelihood by minus 
two and is therefore also called -2LL. The result shows the lack of fit between the model and 
data, and the lower the value the better the model. The deviance measure can not be 
interpreted individually, but can be used to compare different models and see which explains 
the dependent variable best (Luke 2004: 33-34). In the unconditional model the deviance is 
4720.78. This value is different in full (FML) and restricted maximum likelihood (RML). As 
mentioned in chapter three all the calculations in this analysis are conducted with FML. 
 
One problem with the deviance statistic is that making a more complicated model will always 
lead to smaller deviance and therefore be interpreted as an improvement. Measures have 
therefore been made that reward parsimoniousness as well as explanatory power. In this paper 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) will be used. This is one of the measures that punish 
models with many parameters. It is not provided by HLM but can be easily calculated using 
this equation: 
pLLAIC 22 +−=  
Here p is the number of estimated parameters and -2LL the deviance value (Luke 2004: 34-
35). In the unconditional model there are six parameters and the AIC is therefore 4726.78.  
 
The number of iterations used by the software to reach the values is also reported.  The 
program finds a reasonable starting value and then changes these starting values slightly 
several times. When the changes in estimated values become very small as a consequence of 
these changes the iterations stop and the program concludes that the best possible model is 
obtained. In the unconditional model there were nine iterations. Models do sometimes not 
converge under maximum likelihood estimation and consequently there could be an almost 
endless number of iterations. If the program can not estimate values within a reasonable 
number of iterations that usually means that there are problems with the model, especially if 
the dataset is large (Hox 2002: 38-39). Few iterations, on the other hand, is a sign that the 
model is good (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 257). The six iterations used to calculate the 
unconditional model is far from being ominous and the iterations will only be commented on 
later if they indicate problems with the model. 
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5.3 Intercept-as-outcomes model 
There are several ways to conduct multilevel analysis, but a stepwise approach is common 
and will be used in this paper. A model is then first built at the lowest level and higher levels 
are introduced afterwards (Luke 2004: 23). This paper follows Luke (2004: 23) who suggests 
first finding a satisfactory level-1 model and then introduce the level-2 explanations. The 
time-varying explanations at level-1 are therefore introduced in the first model and the time-
constant variables are introduced subsequently. These should first be included in an intercept-
as-outcomes model where the slopes are equal for all the countries. Once such a model is 
established a slopes-as-outcomes model can be tested when there is theoretical justification 
for it. In these models the slopes for each country varies individually. Having many random 
slopes does require a high number of level-1 units, and in this model there are only 27 for 
each country. It also risks producing falsely insignificant results as there is a limited amount 
of variance to be explained (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 256-257). Such an effect will 
therefore only be introduced for the effect of the stability and growth pact because there is a 
theoretical argument that the size of the countries is expected to affect the influence of that 
variable. The one level-1 variable with individual slopes for the countries in all analyses is the 
trend variable that increases by one for each year. This makes it possible to explain the 
different countries’ possible difference in development paths.  
 
5.3.1 The level-1 predictors 
To get reliable multilevel models all relevant explanations should be included in the analysis 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 259). All the level-1 explanations will therefore be included in 
the first model. The ones that are far from significant in this analysis will be excluded in the 
subsequent models. This analysis followingly tests hypothesis 1 (lower deficits in periods of 
growth), hypothesis 2a and 2b (open economies have higher (2a) or lower (2b) deficits), 
hypothesis 3 (high inflation leads to high deficits), hypothesis 4a and 4b (more parties in 
government or parliament leads to higher deficits), hypothesis 5a and 5b (minority 
governments produce higher (5a) or lower (5b) deficits), hypothesis 6b (right-wing parties 
produce high deficits), hypothesis 9a (membership in the stability and growth pact will reduce 
deficits) hypothesis 9b (countries in the accession process to the EMU have lower deficits) 
and hypothesis 10 (deficits are higher in election years). The results from this analysis are 
presented in table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4: Effect of level-1 variables on government surpluses: 
Fixed effects  Coefficient Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept (***)  -4.788 .837 .000 
  Trend slope (***)  .213 .066 .003 
  GDP growth (***)  .184 .051 .001 
  Trade  -.001 .009 .938 
  Inflation   .078 .063 .218 
  ENCP  -.108 .511 .833 
  ENPP  .180 .267 .501 
  Majority  2.225 1.718 .196 
  Centre-left  .428 .416 .305 
  SGP  2.390 1.703 .161 
  Accession EMP  .115 .719 .873 
  Election (*)  -.468 .243 .054 
Random effects Variance component d.f. Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 8.367    
Level-2 (between states)     
  State mean initial score (***) 11.359 45 973.61 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .046 45 302.02 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4616.77 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 16 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4632.77  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 12 
 
The intercept is -4.8. The countries then have 0 GDP growth, imports and exports are 100 
percent of GDP (as 100 were withdrawn from each value on this variable), no inflation and 
one party in government and parliament. The government controls exactly half the members 
in parliament and right wing parties controls all the ministries. The country is not in the 
accession process to the EMU nor a member of the SGP and it does not have an election. This 
is much lower than in the unconditional model, meaning that some of the cause for the GDP 
deficit levels in 1993 can be attributed to level-1 variables. The surplus still increases each 
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year, and with an increase of .213 the coefficient have not changed much from the 
unconditional model. 
 
The GDP-growth variable has a coefficient of .184 and is strongly significant. This 
strengthens the widely held view that deficits are lower during periods of economic growth 
than during periods of economic contraction. More precisely, if the GDP grows by 5 percent 
the surplus is expected to be almost one percentage point higher than if the GDP level is 
stable. The trade variable goes in the direction expected in hypothesis 2b and in the opposite 
direction of what was expected in hypothesis 2a, as open economies are expected to have 
higher deficits than closed ones. This effect is far from being significant however. The 
inflation variable also goes in the opposite direction of what is expected. The variable is not 
significant, but with a relatively low p-value it is worth exploring further in subsequent 
models. 
 
The effective number of parties in government and parliament seems to influence government 
deficits in opposite directions. Higher number of parties in government is associated with 
higher deficits, as expected. On the other hand, a high number of parties in parliament seem to 
lead to lower deficits. These variables measure similar phenomenon and that might affect 
their coefficients. Running the analysis with only one of the variables only weakens 
hypothesis 4a and 4b further. An increase of parties in either government or parliament is then 
associated with an increase in surpluses. Both variables are however far from being 
significant in any of the analyses.  
 
The influence of the majority variable was uncertain and two hypothesizes was therefore 
created, hypothesis 5a (higher deficits under minority governments) and 5b (lower deficits 
under minority governments). This finding seems to support 5a as a 10 percentage point 
increase in the governments support in parliament is expected to increase the surplus by 
approximately a quarter of a percentage point, but the effect is not significant. As the p-value 
was close to 0.2 it was nevertheless included in subsequent models to see if its explanatory 
power might increase. A model was also tested were this variable was exchanged with a 
dummy for majority status. The findings then point in the same direction but the model has 
less explanatory power and the numerical measure was therefore preferred. 
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Right wing governments seem to be associated with higher deficits than other types of 
governments. A government with only right-wing parties is expected to have 0.43 percentage 
point higher deficits than a government with no right wing parties. This supports the view 
stated in hypothesis 6b, but the finding is not significant. Exchanging the centre-left variable 
with the centre-right variable produces a similar finding as a government only consisting of 
left-wing parties is then expected to have 0.49 percentage point lower deficits than a 
government with no left wing parties. That finding is not significant either however and the 
model has slightly less explanatory power. If these findings can be trusted despite their low 
significance levels they indicate that right-wing rather than left-wing parties increase deficits. 
 
Both being a member of the stability and growth pact and being in the accession period to the 
European monetary fund seems to reduce deficits, as expected. The coefficients indicate that 
countries in the SGP have 2.4 percentage point lower deficits than countries that are not 
members. Countries trying to gain access to the EMP have 0.11 percentage point higher 
surpluses than other countries when the other variables are held constant. Neither of these 
effects are significant, but with a p-value of 0.16 the SGP variable is kept in the other models.   
 
Finally and as expected, deficits are half a percentage point higher in election years than at 
other times. This is significant at the ten-percent level and indicates that political factors 
might affect deficits even though the other political variables included in this model not are 
significant. 
 
The random part of the model shows that the level-1 error has decreased from 8.8 in the 
unconditional model to 8.4 in this model. This indicates that more of the variance is explained. 
The reduction in level-1 error can be calculated to find a pseudo R² using the following 
formula: Pseudo R² = (eti (model 1) - eti (model 2))/ eti (model 1) (Singer and Willett 2003: 
103-104). The reduction for level-1 error in this model is therefore (8.8-8.4)/8.8 = 0.05. This 
indicates that approximately five percent of the level-1 variation in deficit levels are explained 
by the variables introduced in this model 5.4 compared to the unconditional model.  On the 
second level the mean trend rate has decreased slightly from 0.053 to 0.046 indicating that 
some of the changes over time have been explained by the level-1 variables. The state mean 
initial score has increased from 10.2 to 11.4. This indicates that level-2 variables are needed 
to explain the average differences between the countries. 
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A likelihood-ratio test can be used to see if a model is significantly better than other models. 
The result of such a test comparing the unconditional model and the model with only level-1 
variables is reported in table 4.5. 
 
Table 5-5: Likelihood ratio test of level-1 model and unconditional model 
Chi-square statistics (***) 104.01 
Number of degrees of freedom 10 
P-value .000 
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 
 
The chi-square at 104.01 is significant well above the .01 level supporting the view that the 
level-1 model explains more of the variation in deficit levels than the unconditional model. 
This is also shown in the reduction in the AIC values from 4727 to 4633. This means that 
despite having just three significant variables, and using the AIC test which punishes the 
level-1 model for being less parsimonious than the unconditional model, there has clearly 
been an improvement in explanatory power. 
 
5.3.2 The level-2 predictors 
Level-2 predictors can be introduced into multilevel models in several ways, but one should 
be careful about introducing too many into the same model when the number of level-2 units 
is limited. A rule of thumb in regression analysis is that one needs ten units per predictor. 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 267) argue that the same rule can be utilized in multilevel 
modeling. With several level-2 outcomes the rule might be a bit liberal however, especially if 
there is high multicollinearity between the level-2 variables.  Collinearity between the level-2 
variables in this analysis is not very high, but neither is the number of level-2 units at 46. 
Followingly all the level-2 variables can not be included in the same model. Two models with 
different level-2 explanations, the political and societal, were therefore tested. In the first one 
the political explanations: the electoral system, whether the country is presidential or 
parliamentary and the quality of government were tested. The second model tested the 
societal explanations: economic inequality, ethnic fractionalization, political instability and 
the share of population over 65. Finally, a model was made that included the significant 
variables from each model. This means that there never was more than four level-2 variables 
in each models and therefore above 10 level-2 units per variable. This gives enough variance 
to be explained and limits the possibility of both type-1 and type-2 error. 
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5.3.2.1 The political explanations 
This model tests hypothesis 7 (deficits higher under majoritarian than proportional electoral 
systems), hypothesis 8 (deficits are lower in presidential than parliamentary countries) and 
hypothesis 11 (deficits decrease as the quality of government increases). The level-1 variables 
that were significant or relatively close to being significant in the first model were also 
included in this model. 
 
Table 5-6: Effect of level-2 political explanations on government surpluses. 
Fixed effects Coefficients Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept (***) -7.337 1.145 .000 
  GDP growth (***) .192 .049 .000 
  Inflation, γ30 .103 .063 .103 
  Majority, γ40 1.782 1.873 .342 
  SGP, γ50 2.055 1.320 .120 
  Election, γ60 (*) -.451 .238 .058 
  Majoritarian electoral system, γ01 (**) 2.038 .994 .046 
  Presidential, γ02 -.241 .944 .800 
  Quality of Government, γ03 (***) 8.382 2.683 .004 
 
Model for deficit growth 
   
  Intercept (***) .267 .096 .008 
  Majoritarian electoral system -.005 .081 .948 
  Presidential .034 .072 .636 
  Quality of government -.135 .199 .501 
Random effects Variance component d.f Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 8.384    
Level-2 variation     
  State mean initial score (***) 8.464 42 683.52 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .047 42 312.30 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4625.84 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 17 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4642.84  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 11 
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The first bloc in the table shows how the different variables affect the initial separatism score. 
The intercept, -7.3, shows the expected separatism score in 1993 when all the explanatory 
variables has the value zero. For the level-2 variables this means that the country has a 
proportional electoral system, is parliamentary and has a quality of government score of 0.5. 
The constant is much lower than it has been in any of the preceding models. The level-1 
variables that are still included in the model have not changed directions or significance. Both 
inflation and the stability and growth pact are now very close to being significant at the .10-
percent level however.  
 
The electoral system has a significant effect on the initial deficit level, but the influence goes 
in the opposite direction of what was expected in hypothesis 7 as countries with majoritarian 
electoral systems are expected to have approximately two percentage point lower deficits than 
countries with proportional electoral systems. The effect is barely significant at the .05-level. 
This variable was used instead of the constituency size variable because it produced a 
significantly better model, but the constituency size variable indicated the same direction of 
influence and was also significant at the .05-level. More precisely, for each additional person 
elected from each constituency the surpluses is expected to increase by 0.03 percentage points. 
The presidential variable is far from significant, and goes in the opposite direction of what 
was expected. Contrary to the claim in hypothesis 8 these findings indicate that presidential 
countries lead a policy with higher deficits than parliamentary countries. The measure of 
quality of government goes in the expected direction. The variable is furthermore highly 
significant, close to the .01-level. An increase by .1 in the quality of government-index is 
expected to decrease the deficit by 0.84 percentage points. This is indicates a substantial 
influence. 
 
The second block under the fixed effects show how the level-2 variables affect the growth rate 
of the deficits. The intercept is .267 and deficits are therefore expected to decrease by close to 
a quarter of a percentage points each year. This effect is still significant at the .01-level and 
the coefficient is slightly higher than in the two preceding models. None of the level-2 
variables can significantly explain the variance over time. The coefficients indicate that the 
effect of presidentialism and quality of government might decrease over time while there is 
almost no change in the effect of electoral systems. 
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The random effects show that more of the unexplained variance in state mean 1993 score has 
now been explained. This value is now 8.5 which is a decrease from both the unconditional 
model (10.2) and the level-1 model (11.4). There has been less change in the mean trend rate 
as its random effect has remained relatively stable. It was .053 in the unconditional model, 
decreased to .046 in the level-1 model and increased slightly again to .047 in this model. This 
is not surprising as none of the included variables could significantly explain the changes over 
time. The level-1 error has also remained relatively stable from the model with all the level-1 
variables.  
 
The deviance value in this model is 4625.84 which is a clear reduction from the unconditional 
model but higher than in the model with all the level-1 variables. Similarly, the AIC-value is 
4642 which is a decrease from the 4726 in the unconditional model, but an increase from the 
4632 in the level-1 model. The results reported in table 4.7 shows that the model with political 
level-2 variables explains significantly more than the unconditional model, but significantly 
less than the full level-1 model. 
 
Table 5-7: Model 4.6 compared with unconditional and level-1 model 
Chi-square statistic (***) 94.94 
Degrees of freedom 11 
Compared with unconditional 
model 
P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 9.07 
Degrees of freedom 1 
Compared with level-1 model 
P-value .003 
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 
 
5.3.2.2 The societal explanations 
The next level-2 model includes the societal explanations: political instability, economic 
inequality, social fractionalization and the proportion of the population over 65. Hypothesis 
12 (higher deficits in politically unstable countries), hypothesis 13a (deficits higher in 
countries with high economic inequality), hypothesis 13b (deficits higher in countries with 
higher social fractionalization) and hypothesis 14 (deficits higher in countries where large 
shares of the population is old) is therefore tested. 
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Table 5-8: Effect of level-2 societal explanations on government surpluses. 
Fixed effects Coefficients Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept -1.370 2.269 .549 
  GDP growth (***) .189 .050 .000 
  Inflation .076 .058 .187 
  Majority 1.678 1.906 .379 
  SGP (*) 2.293 1.314 .081 
  Election (*) -.434 .236 .066 
  Political instability (***) -3.720 1.175 .003 
  Economic inequality -.050 .062 .427 
  Ethnic fractionalization .310 2.480 .902 
  Population over 65 -.274 .212 .202 
 
Model for deficit growth 
   
  Intercept (***) .439 .150 .006 
  Political instability .087 .060 .153 
  Economic inequality (***) .022 .001 .001 
  Ethnic fractionalization -.091 .197 .645 
  Population over 65 .016 .011 .159 
Random effects Variance component d.f Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 8.336    
Level-2 variation     
  State mean initial score (***) 9.169 41 804.84 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .037 41 265.63 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4618.75 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 19 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4637.75  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 9 
 
The intercept again shows the expected value in 1993 when all the other variables has the 
value zero. If this is the case there is no political instability, the country has 50 as their Gini 
value, everyone belongs to the same ethnic group and 2.7 percent of the population is more 
than 65 years old. 
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 At -1.4 the intercept is far lower than it has been in the other analyses, but it is also far from 
significant. The value is therefore unreliable. The level one variables still included have not 
changed directions, but the stability and growth pact has become significant at the .10 percent 
level. Countries that are members of the pact are expected to have 2.3 percentage point lower 
deficits than countries that are not members. 
 
Political instability has a strong influence on fiscal policy according to the results reported in 
table 5-8. The countries with the highest levels of political instability are expected to have 
approximately 7 percentage point higher deficits than the countries with no political 
instability. This is in accordance with hypothesis 12. Economic inequality also affects 
budgetary balance levels in the expected direction, and according to the model a ten point 
increase in Gini-levels (indicating higher inequality) leads to a decrease in surpluses by 
approximately half a percentage point. This is in accordance with hypothesis 13a, but far from 
significant. Ethnic fractionalization goes in the opposite direction of what was expected in 
hypothesis 13b as ethnically heterogeneous countries are expected to have slightly lower 
deficits than ethnically homogenous countries. This effect is far from being significant 
however. Having a high share of the population that is older than 65 affects fiscal policy in 
the direction predicted in hypothesis 14. If this group increases its share of the population by 
10 percentage points the deficit is expected to increase by approximately 2.7 percentage 
points. This effect is not significant. 
 
The surplus is still expected to decrease over time, as it has in the other models. The decrease 
in this model is higher than in the preceding models at 0.44 percentage points each year. 
Economic inequality can significantly explain this variance over time, but in an unexpected 
way. Countries with high economic inequality are expected to get decrease their deficits over 
time more than other countries. If a country increases their Gini-score by 10 it is expected to 
have an increase in surplus levels that is 0.22 percentage points higher than originally 
expected. The other variables are not significant, but their coefficients indicate that if the 
constant effect of the variables might decrease over time. 
 
The random effects part of this model indicates that slightly more of the level-1 variance is 
explained in this model than was explained in the analysis with all the level-1 variables (and 
the analysis with political level-2 variables). Furthermore, more of the initial deficit score has 
been explained than in the model with just level-1 variables or the unconditional model. More 
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of the variation in deficit levels over time has been explained than in any of the preceding 
models. The unmodeled variance for the trend rate is now 0.037, while it was 0.053 in the 
unconditional model and 0.046 in the level-1 model. 
 
Like the model with political level-2 variables, this model does not seem significantly better 
at explaining the deficits than the model with all the level-1 variables. The deviance value in 
this model is 4618.17. That gives an AIC-value of 4637.35, which is lower than in the 
unconditional model (4726.78) but higher than in the model with just level-1 variables which 
had an AIC value of 4632.77. As can be seen in the table below the improvement from the 
unconditional model is significant at the .01-level, while the slight change from the level-1 
model is not significant. The model is therefore not significantly different in its explanatory 
power than the full level-1 model.  
 
Table 5-9: Model 4.8 compared with unconditional and level-1 model 
Chi-square statistic (***) 102.03 
Degrees of freedom 13 
Compared with unconditional 
model 
P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic 1.98 
Degrees of freedom 3 
Compared with level-1 model 
P-value >.500 
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 
 
5.3.2.3 The full level-2 model 
A model was then run with all the level-2 variables that had been significant or close to 
significant in the two preceding models. 
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Table 5-10: Effect of all significant level-2 variables on fiscal deficits 
Fixed effects Coefficients Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept (*) -3.299 1.700 .059 
  GDP growth (***) .191 .050 .000 
  Inflation (*) .102 .058 .078 
  Majority 1.487 1.882 .430 
  SGP 2.073 1.287 .107 
  Election (*) -.439 .235 .061 
  Majoritarian electoral system (**) 1.636 .700 .024 
  Quality of government (***) 10.811 2.961 .001 
  Political instability (***) -3.250 .922 .001 
  Population over 65 (**) -.392 .179 .034 
 
Model for deficit growth 
   
  Intercept (***) .383 .115 .002 
  Political instability .090 .060 .141 
  Economic inequality (***) .020 .006 .003 
  Population over 65 .018 .011 .122 
Random effects Variance component d.f Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 8.361    
Level-2 variation     
  State mean initial score (***) 6.251 41 556.93 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .037 42 268.61 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4604.03 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 18 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4622.03  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 11 
 
The intercept in this model is -3.3 and this is significant at the .10-level. Once again, the level-
1 variables go in the same direction as in the previous analyses. The inflation level is now a 
significant predictor at the .10-level. The stability and growth pact is not significant, but close 
to being significant at the .10-level.  
 
All the level-2 variables included in the model are now significant at least at the .05-level. 
Majoritarian governments are expected to have 1.6 percentage point higher surpluses than 
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proportional systems. A .1-point increase in the quality of government scale is expected to 
lead to a decrease of 1.8 percentage point in deficits. An increase by one on the political 
instability scale leads to a decrease in deficits by 3.25 percentage points and as the proportion 
of the population that is older than 65 increases by one percentage point the deficits are 
expected to increase by 0.4 percentage points. Figure 5-1 shows how differences in the quality 
of government and differences between election and non-election years are expected to 
influence deficits. The two upper lines have government quality values of 0.5, close to the 
highest in the dataset. The two other lines show expected deficit levels for countries with 
government quality values of 0, close to for example Sri Lanka and Turkey’s. The graph 
shows the substantial difference expected between countries with high and low qualities of 
government. The graph also show that the countries are expected to have close to half a 
percentage points higher deficits in election years compared to non-election years. 
 
Figure 5-1: Influence of GDP growth, elections and quality of government on deficits. 
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The deficit levels are still expected to decrease over time, by .4 percentage points each year. 
The Gini-levels can explain some of the change over time and countries with ten Gini point 
higher Gini-levels are expected to increase their surpluses with an additional 0.2 percentage 
points per year. The coefficients also indicate that the effects of political instability and the 
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proportion of the population that is elderly might decrease over time. These effects are not 
significant however. 
 
The level-1 error in this model is similar to the one in the full level-1 model indicating little 
improvement in the explanation of the variance within the countries over time. The 
unexplained variance in the state mean initial score is much lower than in any of the 
preceding models. In the model reported in table 5-10 it is 6.25 compared to 10.2 in the 
unconditional model and 11.4 in the full level-1 model. Much more of the permanent 
differences between the countries have therefore been explained. Furthermore, significantly 
more of the states trend rate is explained than in the two first models. Both of these facts show 
that the level-2 variables are needed to explain the intercept and the states’ developments over 
time. 
 
This model therefore explains government deficits significantly better than any of the 
preceding ones. The deviance of 4604 gives an AIC value 4622. This is a clear decrease from 
both the unconditional model (4726) and the full level-1 model (4633). The results reported in 
table 4.11 shows that both of these decreases are significant at the .01 level and the level-2 
variables clearly improve the explanation of government deficit levels.  
 
Table 5-11: Model 4.7 compared with unconditional and level-1 model 
Chi-square statistic (***) 116.75 
Degrees of freedom 12 
Compared with unconditional 
model 
P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 12.74 
Degrees of freedom 2 
Compared with level-1 model 
P-value .002 
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 
 
As noted in the methods chapter, Botswana is a deviant county at level-2 and an identical 
model was therefore run without that country to see if it unduly influenced the results. This 
did not change the outcome much besides making inflation a less significant predictor of 
deficits. Norway had the second highest surpluses of the countries covered in the study and is 
another outlier, but the exclusion of that country in addition to Botswana does not alter the 
results much either, besides further reducing the influence of the inflation variable and 
making the ideological variable more significant. The inflation variable is then completely 
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insignificant and that indicates that its unexpected significance was a result of the influence of 
these two countries. In this analysis a government with no right-wing parties is expected to 
have 0.65 percentage point higher surpluses than governments with only right-wing parties. 
The finding is significant at the .10-level22.  
 
5.4 Slopes-as-outcomes model 
In a slopes-as-outcomes model the growth line is allowed to differ for each country. We have 
reason to believe that the effect of the stability and growth pact is different in different 
countries as several scholars (Buti and van den Noord 2003 ; Von Hagen 2003 ; de Haan, 
Berger and Jansen 2004) have claimed that the pact has more of an effect on fiscal policy in 
small countries than large ones. Having first established that the effect of this variable does in 
fact differ between the countries, the population size was introduced as an explanation of 
these differences23. The results of this analysis are reported in table 5-12. 
 
It was also possible that countries with different political and societal conditions would react 
differently to economic downturns. There is no evidence that the countries have different 
growth paths on the GDP-growth variable however and this possibility was therefore not 
pursued further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The result for this analysis is included in the appendix (table 8-1). 
23The variable measures the mean of the logarithm of the countries’ population sizes 
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Table 5-12: Slopes-as-outcomes model for the SGP 
Fixed effects Coefficients Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept (*) -2.990 1.617 .071 
  GDP growth (***) .174 .045 .000 
  Inflation (**) .106 .054 .050 
  Majority 1.290 1.911 .430 
  Election (*) -.410 .225 .068 
  Majoritarian electoral system .703 .676 .305 
  Quality of government (***) 10.396 2.297 .000 
  Political instability (**) -3.340 .993 .020 
  Population over 65 (**) -.399 .158 .016 
 
SGP 
   
  Intercept (*) 2.362 1.194 .054 
  Population size (*) -.449 .225 .052 
 
Model for deficit growth 
   
  Intercept (***) .352 .112 .004 
  Political instability (**) .137 .066 .044 
  Economic inequality (***) .019 .006 .003 
  Population over 65 .018 .011 .109 
Random effects Variance component d.f Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 7.682    
Level-2 variation     
  State mean initial score (***) 7.767 7 159.57 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .052 8 91.90 .000 
  SGP mean growth rate (***) 21.43 10 89.25 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4550.56 N (level-1): 1074 
Number of estimated parameters = 22 N (level-2): 47 
AIC = 4572.56  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 18 
 
The effects of the variables remained relatively stable in this model compared to the 
preceding one, but there are some changes. At -3 the intercept level is slightly higher, but also 
less significant. The inflation variable has become barely significant at the .5-level, but again 
most of the effect of the variable disappears if Botswana is removed from the analysis (the 
 75  
only other major change from removing that variable is that the SGP-variable becomes much 
more significant). The electoral system is no longer a significant predictor of mean deficit 
levels, and the political instability variable is now only significant at the .05-level. 
 
In accordance with most previous research the stability and growth pact seems to have less 
influence on the fiscal policy of large countries than small countries. For the smallest country 
(Iceland – which is not a member of the SGP) membership in the pact is expected to reduce 
deficits by 2.36 percentage points, but that effect is reduced drastically as countries becomes 
larger. The difference between the largest (Germany) and smallest (Luxembourg) SGP 
member is more than 5 on the population variable. An increase by one value on this variable 
is expected to reduce the effect by approximately .45. Membership is therefore expected to 
increase Luxembourg’s surpluses by close to two percentage points when the other variables 
are held constant. Membership for the largest countries in the European Union, on the other 
hand, is expected to have minimal influence on fiscal policy. This is illustrated in figure 5-2 
where one can clearly see that the largest EU members, for example Germany with a 
population size of 5.72 and France with a population size of 5.41, are expected to have 
deficits close to the intercept of -3 (the thin line) even if they are members of the SGP. 
 
Figure 5-2: The effect of the stability and growth pact 
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Deficits are still expected to decrease over time with an expected growth rate per year of .35. 
Political instability is now a significant determinant of that change and the initial effect of 
high political instability is expected to diminish over time. This effect is illustrated in figure 
5-3 where all the other variables are at their mean levels. The upper line is for countries with 
the lowest value - zero - on this variable. The second highest line is for countries with the 
value .5, the third highest for countries with the value 1, the fourth the value 1.5 and the 
lowest for the highest value in the study, 1.89. The years vary from -13 in 1980 to +13 in 
2006. One can clearly see the lines converge over time. The effect of instability on fiscal 
policy therefore seems to have diminished over time. The coefficient indicates that the effect 
of having a high proportion of elderly in the population also decreases over time. This effect 
is only close to being significant at the .10-level however. 
 
Figure 5-3: The effect of political instability over time 
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The level-1 error is much lower in this model than it has been in any of the preceding ones at 
7.68. The pseudo R² indicates that 13 percent of the level-1 variance has been explained in 
this model compared to the unconditional one. The unexplained variance for state mean levels 
is slightly higher than in the model with all the significant level-2 variables but no country-
varying slopes. It is considerably lower than in the unconditional or full level-1 model 
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however. Similarly, the unexplained variance for the countries’ mean trend rate is higher in 
this model than in the model reported in table 5-10. These levels are close to the levels in the 
two first models. Pseudo R² can also be run to see how much the level-2 variables have 
explained (Singer and Willett 2003: 104). This indicates that 24 percent of the countries 
average levels have been explained in the final model compared to the unconditional one. 
 
This model seems to be the one that explains deficit levels best. The deviance value of 4551 
gives an AIC value of 4573. This is considerably lower than the unconditional model (4727), 
the full level-1 model (4633) and the model with all the significant level-2 variables (4622). 
The results reported in table 4.13 indicate that all the improvements are significant at the .01-
level. The number of estimation needed for calculating this model is higher than the previous 
ones, but they are still not high enough to indicate problems with the model. 
 
Table 5-13: Model 4.12 compared with unconditional, full level-1 and full level-2 models 
Chi-square statistic (***) 170.21 
Degrees of freedom 16 
Compared with unconditional 
model 
P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 66.20 
Degrees of freedom 6 
Compared with the full level-1 
model 
P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 53.46 
Degrees of freedom 4 
Compared with the full level-2 
model 
P-value .000 
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 
 
 
5.5 Summary of findings 
This section will shortly summarize whether the findings reported earlier in the analysis 
chapter supported, were inconclusive or contradicted the hypothesises. The results for the 
economic variables will be presented first. The political and societal hypothesises, which are 
the main focus of this paper, will be discussed more extensively afterwards. The results are 
summarized in table 5-14. 
 
In accordance with most previous research government deficit seems to be positively 
correlated with economic growth. GDP-growth of one percent is expected to lead to an 
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increase in surpluses by around than .2 percentage point in all the models. This is highly 
significant throughout the analysis. The effect also seems to be equal for most of the countries 
included. There is some evidence that there is a positive relationship between inflation and 
surpluses. This is a very surprising finding as most theorists that have examined possible 
relationships between these two variables have expected a stringent fiscal policy to be harder 
during periods of high inflation. This finding seems to be influenced by the outlier Botswana 
and must therefore be viewed with some scepticism however. Hypothesis 2 a and b are neither 
supported nor rejected and the openness of the economy therefore seems to have a very 
limited influence on fiscal policy.  
 
The main research interest in this paper is on the influence of political and societal factors on 
fiscal policy however. Several of the political and societal variables seem to have a substantial 
influence on the fiscal balance of central governments. There are two main findings 
considering these suggested explanations. One, there were remarkably few of the time-
varying variables that significantly predicted deficit levels. And two, several of the time-
constant phenomena seemed to have a strong influence on fiscal policy. It is especially 
interest that quality of government, which has been given little attention in previous research, 
is a consistently significant predictor of deficit levels. 
 
Hypothesises four, five and six predicted that characteristics of the parties in government or 
parliament would influence deficits. None of these hypothesises found strong support in the 
analysis. Hypothesis 4 a and b predicted that a high number of parties in parliament or 
government would lead to higher deficits. There were no significant effect of these variables 
but the coefficients indicated the possibility of an opposite relationship of what was expected. 
Hypothesis 5 a and b claimed that there was a relationship between the minority status of the 
government and its fiscal balance. Again, there were no significant influences but the 
coefficients indicated that hypothesis 5a, which claimed that minority governments produced 
higher deficits than majority governments, was most likely. Finally, hypothesis 6a and b 
claimed there was a relationship between the governing parties’ ideology and the level of 
surpluses or deficits. The little evidence produced for such a link indicated that left-wing 
governments might produce lower deficits than other types of governments, and especially 
governments with right wing parties (hypothesis six b). This finding was only significant 
when the outliers Botswana and Norway was excluded from the analysis however. 
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Contrary to the expectations in hypothesis 7 countries with majoritarian electoral systems 
seem to produce smaller deficits than countries with more proportional electoral systems. This 
effect is significant in the earlier models and countries with majoritarian electoral systems are 
then expected to have between 1.5 and two percentage points lower deficits than other 
countries. Nevertheless, in the final model the coefficient is drastically reduced and the 
variable becomes insignificant. Hypothesis 8 finds even less support. The variable is very far 
from significant and the coefficient goes in the opposite direction of what was claimed in the 
hypotheses. Consequentially, whether the country is presidential or parliamentary does not 
seem to affect its deficit. 
 
Membership in the stability and growth pact seems to reduce deficit levels, especially for 
small countries. This is in accordance with hypothesis 9a. The final analysis indicates that 
membership in the SGP is likely to reduce the deficit levels of the smallest EU-members by 
around two percentage points while it is expected to have very limited influence on the fiscal 
policy of the largest EU member states. Hypothesis 9b predicted that deficits might also be 
reduced during the accession period to the European Monetary Policy. As expected the 
coefficient for this variable indicates a positive relationship, but the effect is far from 
significant.  
 
Hypothesis 10 claimed that deficits would be larger in election years than at other times. This 
hypothesis is supported in all the models. Deficits as a share of the GDP are expected to 
increase by between .4 and .5 percentage point in election years. This effect is only significant 
at the .10-level however.  
 
The quality of government seems to have a strong impact on central government budgets. As 
was expected in hypothesis 11, countries with high qualities of government are expected to 
generate lower deficits than countries with lower qualities of government. In the final model 
the countries with the highest quality of government are expected to have approximately 6.8 
percentage point higher surpluses than the countries with the lowest deficits. It has therefore 
been a weakness when previous research has not included this as an explanation. 
 
Permanent socioeconomic factors also seemed to influence fiscal policy. Hypothesis 12 stated 
that politically instable countries would have higher deficits than more stable countries. This 
claim is supported in the analysis. India and Israel have much higher values on this variable 
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than the other countries, but even disregarding these countries this variable is expected to 
have a substantial impact on fiscal policy.  The third most unstable country, the UK, is 
expected to have close to three percentage point higher deficits than the most stable countries 
in 1993. The final model indicates that the effect of this variable diminishes substantially over 
the period covered however. In 2006 the difference between the UK and the most stable 
countries in the analysis is expected to have narrowed drastically. 
 
As predicted in hypothesis 13a the coefficients indicate that economically unequal countries 
have higher deficits than equal ones. This effect is far from significant, however. The effects 
of the Gini-coefficient on the change in deficit levels are consistently significant, on the other 
hand, and go in the opposite direction of what was expected. Unequal countries seem to have 
reduced their budget deficits by more than the more equal countries. In the final model 
countries are expected to reduce their annual deficits by close to .2 percentage points more 
than countries which have ten points higher Gini-value. This clearly goes against the 
hypothesis and is a remarkable finding. Ethnic fractionalization does not seem to have a 
strong impact on fiscal policy, and hypothesis 13b is therefore not strengthened. 
 
The final hypothesis was supported.  In the last model the deficit was expected to increase 
by .4 percentage point if the share of the population over 65 increased by one percentage point. 
There were also very limited indications that this effect might have diminished over time, but 
generally these findings were in accordance with hypothesis 14. 
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Table 5-14: The hypothesises and the empirical findings 
Hypothesis Empirical finding 
H1: Economic growth increases surpluses Supported 
H2a: Open economies have higher deficits 
H2b: Open economies have lower deficits 
No significant effects 
H3: High inflation increases deficits Limited support for opposite relationship 
H4a and b: High number of parties in government or 
parliament connected with high deficits 
No significant effects 
H5a: Minority governments produce higher deficits 
H5b: Minority governments produce lower deficits 
No significant effects 
H6a: Left-wing governments produce higher deficits 
H6b: Right-wing governments produce higher deficits 
Very limited support for H6b 
H7: Higher deficits under majoritarian electoral 
systems 
Some support for the opposite relationship, but not 
significant in final model. 
H8: Lower deficits in presidential countries No significant effects 
H9a: Lower deficits when countries are members of 
the SGP. 
Supported. The effect is substantial for small countries 
but decreases the larger the countries are. No effect for 
largest members. 
H9b: Lower deficits in accession period to the EMU No significant effects 
H10: Deficits are higher before election. Supported 
H11: Deficits decrease as quality of government 
increase. 
Supported 
H12: Higher deficits in countries with high political 
instability 
Supported, but effect decreases over time. 
H13a: Higher deficits in economically unequal 
countries 
Support for opposite relationship as economically 
unequal countries decreases the deficits over time. 
H13b: Higher deficits in ethnically fractionalized 
countries 
No significant effects 
H14: Deficits decrease as the elderly share of the 
population increases 
Supported 
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6 CONCLUSION 
There are therefore two main findings of particular theoretical interest in this paper that goes 
against much previous research. First, the type of government in a country is not a significant 
predictor of the countries fiscal policy. Secondly, the quality of government has a bigger 
impact on the fiscal balance than what type of democratic institutions the country has. The 
answer to the main question of this paper, are budget balances political?, is therefore that 
there are no political or institutional choices that can ensure fiscal balance. Governments are 
constrained by the climate within which they operate and when that climate becomes more 
unstable, their political survival is threatened or rule of law weakens the result is more likely 
to be a budget in deficit.  
 
Many of the theories of expected political influence on government budgets have been based 
on the view that by centralising power in few politicians or few parties you will increase fiscal 
stringency and reduce deficits. In this view the ideal government is a one-party majority 
government. It can rule unchallenged which means that it has the freedom to make unpopular 
policies and it does not have to compromise its program. There is little support for this view 
in this analysis.  The form of government does not seem to be a decisive factor in the size of 
government deficits. Furthermore, having high deficits, when controlling for the economic 
climate, has often been seen as a sign of populism and weak government. These findings 
indicate that there is not a significant difference between governments, either in type or 
ideology, in their propensity to lead budgets in deficit. This might also indicate that the 
assumption made by many politicians and scientists that majoritarian governments are more 
efficient than consensual government might be a bit too simplistic. If that is the case and these 
findings are reliable they are welcome news for countries governed by coalition or majority 
governments. 
 
Central government balances rather seem to be influenced by the time-varying economic and 
political factors that influence all countries and the more permanent political and societal 
factors within which political decisions are made. Elections is consistently a significant 
predictor of government budget balances and this indicates that politicians lead different 
politics when they need the consent of their electorate compared to other times when the 
citizens have less possibilities of influencing who govern them. Besides this the budget 
balance seems to be mostly influenced by political and societal factors through the permanent 
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features that determine the climate within which the policy is made. These include the quality 
of the democratic institutions and the degree of political instability.  
 
The quality of democratic institutions seems to have a particularly decisive influence on fiscal 
policy. The method used in this paper allows the researcher to find out what influence 
variables with very limited variance over time have on fiscal policy. Relationships have 
therefore been tested that have remained underexplored in previous research and this has 
made it possible to strengthen the understanding of states’ budgetary behaviour.  
 
The paper does not find which mechanisms that creates this relationship, and this could be 
further investigated in future research. The relationship can arise for several, not mutually 
exclusive reasons. Lack of rule of law and high corruption might make the governments’ 
enforcement of policy less efficient and decision making might be distorted. A high quality of 
bureaucracy might also reduce the effects of changes in political leadership that have been 
found to influence fiscal policy in much previous research. This might enable stability and 
reduce the possibility for the current government to run an unsustainable fiscal policy and 
expect its successor to pay the bill.  
 
One possible conclusion from these findings is that fiscal balance is more determined by 
outside influences than active choices by politicians. No matter what kind of parties are voted 
into government and what constitutional choices are made, fiscal policy will always be 
determined by influences that only to a very limited degree can be influenced by a country’s 
politicians or citizens. This could be the economic fluctuations over time or more permanent 
features such as the quality of government institution and the degree of social trust. Even the 
stability and growth pact only seemed to have an influence when sanctions for non-
compliance could be enforced from the outside. It could however also be that there is no 
common pattern in which parties that leads stringent fiscal policies, but all governments are 
exposed to the economic, political and societal climate within which they govern.  
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Analysis without Botswana and Norway 
 
Table 7-1: Effect of all significant level-2 variables without Botswana and Norway 
Fixed effects Coefficients Robust S.E. P-value 
Model for average deficit score in 1993    
  Intercept (***) -4.486 1.193 .001 
  GDP growth (***) .183 .054 .001 
  Inflation  .055 .047 .241 
  Majority .804 1.785 .652 
  Centre-left .616 .382 .107 
  SGP (*) 2.000 1.123 .075 
  Election (**) -.516 .235 .029 
  Majoritarian electoral system (**) 1.229 .549 .031 
  Quality of government (***) 8.376 1.950 .000 
  Political instability (***) -2.302 .500 .000 
  Population over 65 (**) -.228 .094 .020 
 
Model for deficit growth 
   
  Intercept (**) .252 .103 .019 
  Political instability
 
(*) .116 .061 .065 
  Economic inequality (**) .012 .005 .016 
  Population over 65 .011 .011 .309 
Random effects Variance component d.f Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
  Level-1 error 7.495    
Level-2 variation     
  State mean initial score (***) 3.782 39 379.23 .000 
  State mean trend rate (***) .038 40 279.23 .000 
Model fit Observations 
Deviance = 4283.78 N (level-1): 1020 
Number of estimated parameters = 19 N (level-2): 45 
AIC = 4302.78  
Significance levels: (*) = p<.10, (**) = p<.05, (***) = p<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (maximum likelihood estimation) = 12 
 
